Reuben Hurst Directory Page

Social control agents often struggle to deter organizational deviance. We propose a theory of “status-amplified deterrence” wherein enforcement’s deterrent effects are amplified when carried out against high-status organizational actors. First, this enforcement is interpreted as willingness and ability for far-reaching enforcement. Next, amplified deterrence occurs as these episodes become widely known through (1) extensive media coverage and (2) the marketing efforts of third-party compliance advisors. We examine this theory in the context of the U.S. Department of Justice’s enforcement against Paul Manafort for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Using a difference-in-differences design, we demonstrate that enforcement against Manafort caused a widespread, sustained, and economically significant reduction in FARA noncompliance. We show supplementary evidence consistent with the idea that deterrence was amplified in significant part by media attention and by law firms referencing the episode while successfully marketing FARA advisory services. We contribute to literature illuminating how organizations, in conjunction with third-party compliance advisors, adjust deviant activities in response to shifting regulatory environments.

Reuben Hurst, Jin Hyung Kim (George Washington University) and Jordan Siegel (University of Michigan)

• Corporate Strategy
• Leadership
• Organizational Culture and Change
• Risk Management