Driving a More Prosperous Future
Does earnings management matter for strategy research?
Strategic Managment Journal, August 2025
Strategic management research often uses accounting data, despite well-known concerns that earnings management could obscure the link between actual and measured performance. We apply methods from the econometric literature on bunching to estimate that around 15 percent of firm-year observations in Compustat manipulate accounting earnings to achieve profitability. We show that cash-based performance measures are less susceptible to manipulation and that the choice of accrual versus cash-based measures “matters” for two classic strategy research questions: a decomposition of ROA variance and an analysis of persistence in firm performance. These findings underscore the importance of robustness testing and contribute to an emerging literature that reconsiders the link between theoretical constructs and empirical performance measures.
Gibbs (Purdue), Simcoe (Boston U), and Waguespack (Maryland)
Building credible commitments via board ties: Evidence from the supply chain
November 2025
Using a novel dataset that provides a comprehensive coverage of U.S. firms' industrial supply chain relationships, we find that firms with innovation specific to a buyer are more likely to share a common director with that buyer. This association is stronger when the buyer has a larger number of alternative suppliers. We further find that when a supplier–buyer pair shares a common director, the supplier's R&D investment is more sensitive to the investment opportunities of its buyer. Moreover, such pairs tend to have longer supply chain relationships. Taken together, our findings demonstrate that board ties serve as a credible commitment mechanism to support exchange along the supply chain and safeguard suppliers' buyer-specific investments.
Rebecca Hann, University of Maryland-College Park; Musa Subasi, University of Maryland-College Park; Yue Zheng, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Status-Amplified Deterrence: Paul Manafort’s Prosecution Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
Organization Science, September 2025
Social control agents often struggle to deter organizational deviance. We propose a theory of “status-amplified deterrence” wherein enforcement’s deterrent effects are amplified when carried out against high-status organizational actors. First, this enforcement is interpreted as willingness and ability for far-reaching enforcement. Next, amplified deterrence occurs as these episodes become widely known through (1) extensive media coverage and (2) the marketing efforts of third-party compliance advisors. We examine this theory in the context of the U.S. Department of Justice’s enforcement against Paul Manafort for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Using a difference-in-differences design, we demonstrate that enforcement against Manafort caused a widespread, sustained, and economically significant reduction in FARA noncompliance. We show supplementary evidence consistent with the idea that deterrence was amplified in significant part by media attention and by law firms referencing the episode while successfully marketing FARA advisory services. We contribute to literature illuminating how organizations, in conjunction with third-party compliance advisors, adjust deviant activities in response to shifting regulatory environments.
Reuben Hurst, Jin Hyung Kim (George Washington University) and Jordan Siegel (University of Michigan)