Evan Starr Directory Page
Evan Starr
Professor
Ph.D, Economics, University of Michigan
Evan Starr is a Professor of Management & Organization at the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland. He received a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan and a bachelor's degree from Denison University. He originally hails from Claremont, California. Starr's current research examines issues at the intersection of human capital accumulation, employee mobility, entrepreneurship, and innovation. In a recent set of projects utilizing employee-employer matched data and survey data that he and coauthors developed, Starr examined the use and impacts of noncompete agreements and their enforceability on the provision of firm-sponsored training, employee mobility and earnings, and on the creation, growth, and survival of new ventures.
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Recent Research
Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
Quarterly Journal of Economics
We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes (all contracts also included a nondisclosure agreement). Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36–52% and raises workers’ total earnings from the two firms by 12–17%. We find no evidence—rejecting even small effects—that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms’ post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.
Bo Cowgill (Columbia), Brandon Freiberg (INSEAD), Evan Starr (UMD)
Nondisclosure agreements and externalities from silence
PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences)
How do contractual restrictions on worker voice affect information flows about employers? We develop a framework in which the legal risk from violating a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) reduces the willingness of workers to share negative information, making it more difficult for high-road employers to differentiate themselves to workers. Empirical support for these ideas comes from studying the relationship between NDA use and the content of Glassdoor reviews after three states prohibited employers from using NDAs to conceal unlawful conduct. By curtailing the flow of negative information, NDAs impose negative externalities on workers who value such information and on competing employers who are less able to stand out.
Jason Sockin, Cornell, Aaron Sojourner, UpJohn, Evan Starr, UMD