Wedad J. Elmaghraby Directory Page
Wedad J. Elmaghraby
Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley
Wedad J. Elmaghraby is Dean’s Professor of Operations Management at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park. Her research interests are at the interface of operations management, economics and behavioral decision making. Her current research includes online auctions in business-to-business secondary markets, online platforms to promote sustainable business paradigms, and behavioral factors in business-to-business contract design. She currently serves as a Department Editor at M&SOM and has served as the President of the MSOM Society, the Behavioral Operations Section, and POMS College of Behavior in Operations Management. She currently serves as the co-director of the Smith Analytics Consortium. Prior to joining the Smith School, she was on the faculty of the School of Industrial and Systems Engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology and NYU Stern School of Business in the Operations Management group.
Bimpikis K, Elmaghraby WJ, Moon K, Zhang W. Managing Market Thickness in Online Business-to-Business Markets. Management Science [Internet]. 2020;66 (12) :5783-5822. Publisher's Version
We explore marketplace design in the context of a business-to-business platform specializing in liquidation auctions. Even when the platform’s aggregate levels of supply and demand remain fixed, we establish that the platform’s ability to use its design levers to manage the availability of supply over time yields significant value. We study two such levers, each using the platform’s availability of supply as a means to incentivize participation from buyers who decide strategically when/how often to participate. First, the platform’s listing policy sets the ending times of incoming auctions (hence, the frequency of market clearing). Exploiting a natural experiment, we illustrate that consolidating auctions’ ending times to certain weekdays increases the platform’s revenues by 7.3% mainly by inducing a higher level of bidder participation. The second lever is a recommendation system that can be used to reveal information about real-time market thickness to potential bidders. The optimization of these levers highlights a novel trade-off. Namely, when the platform consolidates auctions’ ending times, more bidders may participate in the marketplace (demand-side competition); but ultimately auctions for substitutable goods cannibalize one another (supply-side competition). To optimize these design decisions, we estimate a structural model that endogenizes bidders’ dynamic behavior, that is, their decisions on whether/how often to participate in the marketplace and how much to bid. We find that appropriately designing a recommendation system yields an additional revenue increase (on top of the benefits obtained by optimizing the platform’s listing policy) by reducing supply-side cannibalization and altering the composition of participating bidders.
Devlin A, Elmaghraby W, Hamilton R. Partitioning Cash Flows to Overcome Retailer Aversion to Stocking New Products. Decision Sciences. 2020.
Coskuna A, Elmaghraby W, Karaman M, Salman F. Relief Aid Stocking Decisions under Bilateral Agency Cooperation. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences [Internet]. 2019;67. Publisher's Version
Bimpikis K, Elmaghraby W, Moon K, Zheng W. Mitigating Monitoring Costs via Auction Listing Policies. to appear in Management Science. 2019.
Elmaghraby WJ, Gopal A, Pilehvar A. Starting Prices in Liquidation Auctions: Evidence from Field Experiments. Production and Operations Management. 2017.
Devlin A, Elmaghraby W, Hamilton R. Why Do Suppliers Prefer Wholesale Price Contracts: The Role of Retailer Incentives for Investing Marketing Effort. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science. 2017.
Pilehvar A, Elmaghraby WJ, Gopal A. Market Information and Bidder Heterogeneity in Secondary Market Online B2B Auctions. Management Science. 2017;63 (5) :1271-1656.
Elmaghraby WJ, W. Jank SZ, Karaesmen I. Sales Force Behavior, Pricing Information and Pricing Decisions. M&SOM. 2015;17 (4) :495-510.
Elmaghraby WJ, Larson N. Explaining Deviations from Equilibrium in Auctions with Avoidable Fixed Costs. Games and Economic Behavior. 2012 :131-159.
Elmaghraby W, Jank W, Karaesmen I, Zhu S. An Exploratory Analysis of B2B Price Changes. Journal of Pricing and Revenue Management. 2012;11 :607-624.
Elmaghraby WJ, Katok E, Santamaria N. A Laboratory Investigation of Rank Feedback in Procurement Auctions. M&SOM. 2012;14 :128-144.
Elmaghraby WJ, Lippman SA, Tang CS, Yin R. Will More Purchasing Options Benefit Customers?. Production and Operations Management. 2009;18 (4) :381-401.
Elmaghraby WJ, Gulcu A, Keskinocak P. Designing Optimal Markdown Mechanisms in the Presence of Rational Customers with Multi-unit Demands. M&SOM. 2008;10 (1) :126 - 148.
Elmaghraby WJ. Auctions within e-Sourcing Events. Productions and Operations Management. 2007;16 (4) :409-422.
An N, Elmaghraby WJ, Keskinocak P. Bidding strategies and their impact on auctioneer’s revenue in combinatorial auctions. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management. 2005;3 (4) :337-357.
Elmaghraby WJ. The Effect of Asymmetric Bidder Size on the Performance of an Auction: Are More Bidders Always Better?. Management Science. 2005;51 (12) :1763-1776.
Elmaghraby WJ. Multi-Unit Auctions with Dependent Valuations: Issues of Efficiency in Electricity Auctions. European Journal of Operations Research. 2005;166 :430-448.
Deng S, Elmaghraby WJ. Parallel Sourcing with a Tournament. Productions and Operations Management. 2005;14 (2) :252-276.
Elmaghraby WJ, O’Neill R, Rothkopf M, Stewart W. Pricing and Efficiency in Lumpy Energy Markets. The Electricity Journal. 2004 :54-64.
Elmaghraby WJ, Keskinocak P.Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inventory Considerations. Management Science. 2003;49 (10) :1287-1309.
Elmaghraby WJ. The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions. Management Science. 2003;49 (5) :673-682.
Elmaghraby WJ. Supply Contract Competition and Sourcing Policies. M&SOM. 2000;2 (4) :350-371.
Elmaghraby WJ, Oren SS.The Efficiency of Multi-Unit Electricity Auctions. The Energy Journal. 1999;20 (4) :89-116.
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