FALL 2005
VOL. 7 NO. 1

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    New Lessons about Leadership from Trauma Teams    Reducing Airport Congestion
    Do Entrepreneurs Really Think Differently?
    Strategic Underwriting in Initial Public Offers    Faculty Awards and Honors

Underpricing is common in initial public offerings. But some firms consistently sell new stock issues at a much greater discount than others. Is this phenomenon driven by purely competitive forces, or by a system that does not adequately protect IPO issuers from predatory underwriting practices?

Gerard Hoberg, assistant professor of finance, is one of many academians exploring the lines between ethical and unethical conduct in the wake of the spectacular corporate scandals of recent times. His research indicates that some underwriters may use underpricing as a profit-maximizing strategy, to the detriment of the issuers, average investors and the engine that drives business development. “Institutional underwriters persistently underprice because it is profitable for them,” says Hoberg bluntly. “They would say that they choose the investors whose hands are the strongest, to build a stable investment base for the issuer. But these same institutional investors often sell their shares within days of the IPO, while the average investor holds on to stocks for a long time.”

The practice of persistently discounting stock prices in IPOs has a distinct downside. “There are two effective losers—the issuers and society,” says Hoberg. “The issuers lose because they realize less capital on their IPO when their stock is underpriced. But society loses too, because of the wealth loss involved when that issuing company isn’t able to grow as fast and create as many new jobs.” Average investors also lose out when stocks are highly discounted, simply because they are unable to get shares in an oversubscribed offering.

Random allocation, Hoberg believes, would make it much less profitable for underwriters to persistently underprice. “If you take away an underwriter’s ability to profit from allocation, then they would be relying simply on commission for profit. And competition will drive commissions to the right level.” 

Read more about this research in Research@Smith.

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