Smith Faculty Opinion Article
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By Dr. Peter Morici, Professor of International Business
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November 11, 2009
Bank Reform Legislation
As you read in this morning's WSJ, Senator Dodd has offered a sweeping bank regulatory
reform bill.
The bills introduced in the House and Senate (Dodd) focus too much on who does
what-reorganizing who regulates what banks and which activities. Those would regulate
banks in a badly and too costly way by imposing too many costly requirements instead
of improving the principles of good banking practice and risk management.
For example, imposing a consul of regulators on systemic risk and oversight is
a terrible mistake-either it will be management by committee (an interagency group
that reaches consensus slowly and badly in crises) or it will be dominated by its
chair who will be engaged in tugs of war with the Fed Chairman at times when decisive,
surgical and dramatic action is required.
Ultimately, the Fed must provide the resources for resolution of failing entities
having systemic consequences-disasters the size of Lehman or AIG-because no fund
envisioned by taxing big firms will be big enough. The FDIC already collects such
a tax from banks (FDIC insurance premiums) and that fund has proven to be too small
for the failures of regional banks. In the end, the Fed must provide the money.
Will this new systemic risk panel force the Fed to print it? It is a terrible idea
to put those powers into the hands of a more political body.
Consolidation of Controller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision
is smart, but consumer protection belongs in the new agency too. If consumer protection
is put in a separate agency, then the health of the banks in the regulation of things
such as community lending mandates will be ignored-Congressional mandates were among
the principal causes of the Fannie Mae failure. A political appointee will make
banks do reckless things and create all kinds of problems.
Proposed legislation envisions taxing and micro managing banks, instead of relying
on: stronger capital requirements; insulating (separating) the banks from the casino,
and establishing principals of good practice that should guide the decisions of
regulators and bankers alike.
Instead:
Leave general bank holding company oversight and systemic risk regulation at
the Fed, and consolidate other bank regulation and consumer protection. Give the
Fed resolution authority for entities to large or complex for the FDIC to handle
Stronger capital requirements-that's motherhood
Separate commercial bank balance sheets/assets from those of investment banks,
hedge funds, etc. Base banking compensation solely on banking activities-that will
solve the compensation issue privately if commercial bank investments in securities
and the derivatives market are adequately reformed
Don't bring back Glass Steagall but do limit the scope of acceptable securities
that may backup bank deposits-get banks out of betting on securities, which was
a major problem at regional banks as well on Wall Street
Require adequate assets to secure derivatives contracts-something that was woefully
lacking at AIG, Lehman's etc. More than reporting, that will help reduce abuses
in derivatives trading and their threat to systemic stability
Reform lending practices, which is already happening thanks to Federal Reserve
action
Peter Morici is a professor at the University
of Maryland School of Business and former Chief Economist at the U.S. International
Trade Commission.