Smith Faculty Opinion Article
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By Dr. Peter Morici, Professor of International Business
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January 22, 2009
Fixing the Banks
For every new president, campaign promises and inaugural idealism must give way
to the hard choices that measure the mettle of their leadership.
Now Barack Obama must act pragmatically to fix the banks or the economy will
sink under their weight.
Banks continue to suffer losses on bonds backed by failing mortgages, credit
cards and auto loans, and questionable corporate debt. To assist, the Treasury has
used TARP funds to purchase capital in healthy and deeply troubled banks alike;
however, no one can calibrate how high bank losses will go, because no one knows
how far housing prices will drop and how many loans will ultimately fail.
The Obama Treasury could put a floor under bank losses, through government guarantees
on their bonds, or by creating an aggregator bank that purchases those securities
from banks altogether.
Guarantees would give the banks profits on bonds whose underlying loans are mostly
repaid, and shift to taxpayers losses from those bonds whose loans are mostly not
repaid. That would require additional large subsidies from taxpayer to the banks.
An aggregator bank, however, could turn a profit. It could purchase all the commercial
banks’ potentially questionable securities, at their current mark to market values,
with its own common stock and funds provided by the TARP. Then the aggregator bank
could balance profits on those securities whose loans pan out against losses on
securities whose loans fail.
An aggregator bank could perform triage on mortgages. It could work out those
whose homeowners can be saved with some adjustments in their loan balances, interest
rates and repayment periods; foreclose on mortgages whose homeowners could not meet
payments with reasonably concessions; and leave other loans alone.
Commercial banks acting alone cannot accomplish triage as effectively, because
individually they can have little effect on how much housing values will fall. In
contrast an aggregator bank, holding so many mortgages and working in cooperation
with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, could have a salutary impact on housing values.
It could put some breaks on falling home prices.
Beyond toxic securities, policymakers need to fix what got banks into this mess.
The 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall permitted the creation of financial supermarkets,
like Citigroup, that combined commercial banks with investment banks, brokerages,
and the bizarre universe of hedge and private equity funds.
Those nonbank financial firms are run by salesmen and financial engineers that
don’t understand long-term commitments as bankers to borrowers with solid incomes
and sound business plans. Investment bankers, securities dealers and fund managers,
essentially, get paid commissions on sales and for betting other peoples’ money
on arbitrage opportunities. They put together people that have money with those
that need money, and those people that can't bear risk with those that can.
In contrast, commercial bankers, historically, had skin in the game—bank capital
and a fiduciary responsibility to depositors. They were paid salaries, not commissions
on the volume of loans they wrote or bought from mortgage brokers to package into
bonds. They expected to be fired if their loans prove imprudent.
To investment bankers and securities dealers, it does not matter how risky a
loan is, because they can always bundle it into a bond to sell it off or insure
it with a swap. That's nonsense, as we have learned. Adopting that thinking commercial
banks got stuck with too many loan-backed bonds and buying swaps that were not backed
by adequate assets.
Commercial banks need to be separate and more highly regulated. The ongoing process
of breaking up Citigroup and placing its banking activities into a separate entity
should be replicated at other Wall Street and large regional banks.
Freed from toxic assets and the complications of affiliations with financial
institutions having other agendas, commercial banks could raise new private capital
and make new prudent loans as President Obama’s stimulus package lifts consumer
spending and business prospects.
Such approaches would disappoint those who champion unbridled free markets but
Wall Street’s financiers have abused the opportunities offered them by deregulation
to the peril of the nation.
President Obama needs to craft solutions that address the world as he finds it
not as intellectuals tell him it should be.
Peter Morici is a professor at the University
of Maryland School of Business and former Chief Economist at the U.S. International
Trade Commission.