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Smith
Faculty Opinion Article
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September
26, 2007
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By Dr. Peter Morici, Professor
of International Business
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WEB SITE
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UAW - GM Pact Leaves
GM at Cost Disadvantage
The details that emerged in the press
today about the historic UAW - GM labor
pact indicate the deal may prove the
death knell for yet many more Midwestern
manufacturing jobs.
Although, GM, by funding an
independent trust, has managed to move
retiree health care costs off the books,
the residual liability remains unclear.
As with the Delphi spin off, if GM must
step in when the health care trust runs
out of cash, this may prove nothing more
than a bookkeeping rouse. Otherwise, Mr.
Gettelfinger has set up his successor to
deliver the bad news to GM retirees,
that there is just not enough money to
meet their expectations. The actual
outcome will like lie between those two
extremes.
That aside, much of GMs labor cost
disadvantage lies in the wages and
fringe benefits it pays workers making
cars today--those are not legacy costs.
The pact does not much reduce the
premium GM pays over Toyota, except only
new hires. Temporary workers will be
upgraded to the existing pay structure,
and according to the Detroit Free
Press, only those new hires that are
not directly involved in the production
of vehicles will be offered the new,
lower pay scale.
Toyota already has the ability to
differentiate pay among production
workers and those that mow the lawn, and
the fundamental cost disadvantage
imposed by GMs high scale for workers on
the line remains. The pact does not call
for new pay raises but it does provide
for significant bonuses in the out years
of the contract; hence, the pact raises
pay but GM and the UAW hope investors
wont notice.
Lost in all the coverage has been the
fact that legacy costs are only part of
GMs problem. This pact does a lot to
reduce legacy costs but not enough to
eliminate the actual costs GM faces
making vehicles today.
Other disadvantages will also
continue to apply. For example, the
agreement constrains GM investments,
such as commitments to make certain
products in the United States, that
Toyota and other Asians do not face. The
same goes for burdensome work rules and
limits on locating and selecting
suppliers to maximize supply chain
efficiency
Overall, GM was very very
uncompetitive before this deal and is
now just very uncompetitive.
The pacts ultimate impact will depend
on how the agreement is applied to
Chrysler and Ford. Those companies can
less afford to continue the madness the
UAW imposes. If they buy into this pact,
GM may continue to hold is own while
Toyota and the other Asian manufactures
eat up Chrysler and Ford.
Its the old story of the bear chasing
hunters in the woods. The fastest hunter
does not have to worry, because the bear
will eat the slowest runner.
Peter Morici is a professor at the
University of Maryland School of
Business and former Chief Economist at
the U.S. International Trade Commission.