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Smith
Faculty Opinion Article
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August 14,
2007
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By Dr. Peter Morici, Professor
of International Business
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U.S.
Records $58.1 Billion Trade Deficit in
June
Oil, China and Auto Parts Push Up
Deficit
Today, the Commerce Department
reported the June deficit on trade in
goods and services was $58.1 billion.
This was down from the $59.2 billion
deficit in May but was still about 5.1
percent of GDP. This was lower than
expected. The consensus forecast was
$61.0 billion.
The petroleum deficit decreased to
$23.4 billion in June from $23.8 billion
in May, while the trade deficit on
nonpetroleum products increased to $42.3
from $42.2 billion.
The trade deficit with China
increased to $21.2 billion in June from
$20.0 billion in May.
Trade with China contributes nearly
as much to the trade deficit as
petroleum, making the yuan-dollar
exchange rate as important as the price
of oil in determining the size of the
trade deficit and the outlook for U.S.
GDP and jobs growth.
The deficit on automotive products
increased to $10.0 million in June from
$9.0 billion in May. This has been
pushed up mostly by imports of auto
parts.
Since December 2001, the U.S. monthly
trade deficit has increased $31.5
billion. This has saddled the economy
with a huge foreign debt and slowed
growth. Dysfunctional energy policies
and the overvalued dollar against the
Chinese yuan are responsible for 100
percent of this growth.
To finance trade deficits, Americans
have borrowed more than $6 trillion,
over and above foreign direct investment
in the United States, and the debt
service comes to about $300 billion a
year.
By reducing the demand for high-skill
and technology-intensive products, U.S.
made goods and services, the deficit
reduces GDP by about $250 billion , and
by cutting investments in R&D and labor
skills, the trade deficit cuts potential
annual economic growth from about 4
percent a year to 3 percent.
The manufacturing sector is
particularly hard it. Over the last 85
months, over 3.3 jobs have been lost.
The rapid growth in the nonpetroleum
deficit is responsible for the loss of
about 2 million manufacturing jobs,
mostly in technology-intensive durable
goods industries where inexpensive
Chinese labor offers few competitive
advantages. The balance of the job
losses were caused by improvements in
labor productivity.
Breaking down the Deficit
Petroleum, China and automotive
products account for about 95 percent of
the trade deficit, and no solution is
possible without addressing issues
particular to these segments.
Petroleum products account for $23.4
billion of the monthly trade gap. Since
December 2001, net petroleum imports
have increased $17.9 billion, as the
average price of a barrel of imported
oil has risen from $15.46 to $ 60.95,
and monthly imports have increased from
353 million to 413 million barrels.
Technologies such as simply retuning
conventional gasoline engines and
transmissions, hybrid systems, lighter
weight steel and other materials, and
alternative energy sources could
substantially reduce U.S. dependence on
foreign oil. Also, more reliance on
nuclear power could substantially reduce
dependence on imported oil.
Accelerating the build out of these
solutions requires national leadership,
but both Republican and Democratic Party
leaders have failed to champion a policy
framework that would accomplish what is
now clearly possiblegreatly reduced
dependence on Middle East oil and the
threats to national security it creates.
China accounted for $23.4 billion of
the June trade deficit, up from $5.5
billion in December 2001. The bilateral
deficit remains stubbornly keeps rising,
because China undervalues the yuan, and
this makes Chinese exports artificially
inexpensive and U.S. products too
expensive in China. Efforts to curb
Chinas exports through administrative
measures have failed, and without
meaningful exchange rate adjustments,
the trade deficit will continue to
bedevil U.S.-China relations.
Although China revalued the yuan from
8.28 to 8.11 in July 2005 and announced
it would adjust the currency to a basket
of currencies, the yuan continues to
track the dollar closely and currently
is trading at about 7.58. Rather than
letting the yuan float against a basket,
China has established a crawling peg
against the dollar.
Through tightly choreographed
intervention, the yuan has been
permitted the yuan to rise 3.2 percent
every twelve months. Modernization and
productivity advances raise the implicit
value of the yuan about 5 percent every
twelve months, and the yuan remains
undervalued against the dollar by at
least 40 percent.
Chinas huge trade surplus creates an
excess demand for yuan on global
currency markets; however, to limit
appreciation of the yuan against the
dollar and drive its value down against
the euro, the Chinese central bank
purchases about $250 billion in U.S. and
other foreign currency and securities
each year. This comes to about 9 percent
of Chinas GDP and about 25 percent of
its exports. These purchases provide
foreign consumers with two trillion yuan
to purchase Chinese exports, and create
a 25 percent off budget subsidy on
foreign sales of Chinese goods, and an
even larger implicit tariff on Chinese
imports.
In addition, China provides numerous
tax incentives and rebates, and low
interest loans, to encourage exports and
replace imports with domestic products.
These practices clearly violate Chinas
obligations in the WTO and it agreed to
remove those when it joined the trade
body. The Bush Administration has filed
a WTO petition to force China to either
rescind these practices or ultimately to
face WTO approved tariffs to offset
their effects.
Consistent with WTO rules, the United
States has recently decided to apply its
countervailing duty laws to subsidized
Chinese imports, as it does to imports
from Japan, Korea and most
industrialized and developing countries.
This will permit private U.S. firms
harmed by Chinas subsidized exports to
bring suit for relief, and these actions
would bring quicker and more certain
action than the WTO complaint process.
However, the Bush Administration did
not include Chinas undervalued currency
and foreign exchange market intervention
in its WTO complaint, despite the fact
that these practices have been
identified as a subsidy encouraging
exports by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben
Bernanke. Currency subsidies are the
largest single subsidy China applies to
exports, and export subsidies are
considered to be among the most
egregious violations of WTO rules.
Many U.S. multinationals
corporations, like GE, Caterpillar and
GM, earn huge profits from investments
in Chinas protected markets. U.S. MNCs
have profited greatly from currency
manipulation and other Chinese
protectionism that blatantly violates
WTO rules; hence, it is not surprising
they have lobbied the Congress and
Administration not to take action
against Chinese mercantilism and have
persistently characterized as
protectionist U.S. advocates for
affirmative steps to offset Chinas
export subsidies. The Bush
Administration has bent to these
pressures, refusing to even acknowledge
the subsidy on exports Chinas currency
market intervention creates, and has
placed these corporate interests ahead
of free trade principles.
The history of WTO disputes
addressing broad subsidies, like tax
holidays and bank credits, indicate the
U.S. complaint against tax and credit
subsidies will likely take years to
resolve. China will have many options to
reconfigure these practices before it
ultimately, if ever, relinquishes them.
The real danger is that the Bush
Administration is using the WTO
complaint process to butt congressional
pressure to apply the countervailing
duty laws to China and to avoid taking
meaningful steps against Chinese
currency manipulation.
Automotive products account for about
$10.0 billion of the monthly trade
deficit. Since December 2001, the
deficit on vehicles and parts has
increased $421 million or 4.4 percent,
while the parts deficit has increased
$1.2 billion or 87 percent.
Japanese and Korean manufacturers
have captured a larger market and are
expanding their U.S. production.
However, Asian manufacturers tend to use
more imported components than domestic
companies, and GM and Ford are pushing
their parts suppliers to move to China.
The U.S. remains a competitive place
to make cars and many components;
however, GM, Ford and Chrysler carry a
$2,900 cost disadvantage against Toyota
plants located in the United States,
thanks to clumsy management, excessive
executive compensation, and the
unrealistically high wages, costly
health benefits and arcane work rules
imposed by contracts with the United
Auto Workers. These disadvantages far
exceed those imposed by legacy costs,
such as providing health benefits for
retired blue collar workers, and it
would persist even with the
implementation of national health
insurance.
In addition, the yen may be even more
undervalued against the dollar than the
yuan, thanks to sluggish growth and near
zero interest rates in Japan. However
fundamental realignment of the yen
dollar exchange rate is unlikely,
because Treasury Secretary Paulson has
voiced an agnostic position about the
significance of the values of the yen
and yuan.
The auto industry sorely needs a
fairly valued yen, better management,
and new labor contracts that align costs
with Toyota and other Asia transplants
operating in the United States.
Essential elements would include pay for
performance, health benefits in line
with those offered by most U.S.
employers, and adopting defined
contributions pensions systems. Without
these essential reforms, even the
reincarnation of Henry Ford and Alfred
Sloan could not save the domestic
automakers from their inevitable ride
through Chapter 11.
Deficits, Debt and Growth
Trade deficits must be financed by
foreigners investing in the U.S. economy
or Americans borrowing money abroad.
Direct investments in the United States
provide only about a tenth of the needed
funds, and Americans borrow nearly $50
billion each month. The total debt is
more than $6 trillion, and at five
percent interest, the debt service comes
to about $2000 per U.S. worker each
year.
High and rising trade deficits tax
economic growth. Each dollar spent on
imports, not matched by a dollar of
exports, shifts workers into activities
where productivity is lower and reduces
domestic demand and employment.
Productivity is at least 50 percent
higher in industries that export and
compete with imports, and reducing the
trade deficit and moving workers into
these industries would increase GDP.
Also, by suppressing wages and benefits,
the trade deficit has pushed down the
percentage of adults participating in
the labor force.
Were the trade deficit cut in half,
GDP would increase by nearly $250
billion, or about $1500 for every
working American. Workers wages would
not be lagging inflation, and ordinary
working Americans would more easily find
jobs paying higher wages and offering
decent benefits.
Manufacturers are particularly hard
hit by this subsidized competition.
Through recession and recovery, the
manufacturing sector has lost 3.3
million jobs since 2000. Following the
pattern of past economic recoveries, the
manufacturing sector should have
regained about 2 million of those jobs,
especially given the very strong
productivity growth accomplished in
durable goods and throughout
manufacturing.
Longer-term, persistent U.S. trade
deficits are a substantial drag on
growth. U.S. import-competing and export
industries spend three-times the
national average on industrial R&D, and
encourage more investments in skills and
education than other sectors of the
economy. By shifting employment away
from trade-competing industries, the
trade deficit reduces U.S. investments
in new methods and products, and skilled
labor.
Cutting the trade deficit in half
would boost U.S. GDP growth by one
percentage point a year, and the trade
deficits of the last two decades have
reduced U.S. growth by one percentage
point a year.
Lost growth is cumulative. Thanks to
the record trade deficits accumulated
over the last 10 years, the U.S. economy
is about $1.5 trillion smaller. This
comes to about $10000 per worker.
The damage grows larger each month,
as the Bush administration dallies and
ignores the corrosive consequences of
the trade deficit.
Peter Morici is a professor at the
University of Maryland School of
Business and former Chief Economist at
the U.S. International Trade Commission.
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