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Smith Faculty Opinion Article |
December 14, 2005 |
October
Trade Deficit Hits New Record;
A Stronger
Dollar Indicates More Record Deficits in
the Months Ahead;
Deficits Stifle Growth and Don't Look to
the Doha Round to Help
By Dr. Peter Morici,
Professor of International Business
Today, the Commerce Department reported the October trade deficit was $68.9 billion, piercing the record set in September, $66 billion. A strong dollar and continued currency market intervention by China indicate the trade deficit will likely hit new records in the months ahead.
Longer term, the Doha Round, if
it succeeds, will only widen the
gap.
It is particularly noteworthy
that the U.S. trade deficit with
China hit a new record, $20.5
billion.
In October, higher payments for
imported oil prices played a key
role; however, the deficit on
nonpetroleum goods increased
significantly too.
Since December 2001, the trade
deficit has increased $42.3 billion,
and petroleum products account for
only 44 percent of this increase.
The growing U.S. appetite for
low-cost nonpetroleum consumer
goods, capital goods, and industrial
materials and components, especially
from Asia, account for more than
half of the growth of the trade
deficit.
The trade deficit has increased
in 2005, despite a falling federal
budget deficit, and with the dollar
strengthening again, the trade
deficits will grow in the months
ahead.
Going forward, increasing demand
for petroleum imports and a stronger
dollar are likely to push up the
trade deficit. Higher deficits in
the fourth quarter will slow growth,
and wages, which got a lift in
October, will barely keep up with
inflation over the next six to
twelve months.
In large measure, the trade
deficit remains stubbornly high,
because the overvalued dollar pushes
up imports of inexpensive
manufactures and handicaps U.S.
exports of durable goods and
high-end services, and this
situation is likely to become worse
in months ahead.
Currently, the average exchange
rate for the dollar is 13 percent
lower than in January 2002; however,
the dollar has declined only 2.5
percent against Chinese yuan and is
up against other developing country
currencies. The dollar is down 22
percent against the euro and other
industrialized-country currencies,
while it is up an average of 0.2
percent against the Chinese yuan and
other developing-country currencies
combined.
Business and political prospects
in Europe have weakened in 2005, and
the dollar has risen. Together with
higher oil prices, a stronger dollar
will push the trade deficit to new
record highs in the months ahead.
The monthly trade deficit will
likely exceed $70 billion by
mid-2006.
As the Fed completes its cycle of
interest rate increases, the
unemployment rate is not likely to
fall below 5 percent. In contrast,
in 2000, the unemployment rate
bottomed out at 3.8 percent. The
more than one percentage point
increase in the structural
unemployment rate over the business
cycle may be laid squarely at the
feet of the trade deficit and the
overvalued dollar.
Manufacturers are particularly
hard hit. Through recession and
recovery, the manufacturing sector
has lost 3 million jobs. Following
the pattern of past economic
recoveries, the manufacturing sector
should have regained about 2 million
of these jobs, especially given the
very strong productivity growth
accomplished in durable goods and
throughout manufacturing.
Large U.S. trade deficits flood
international currency markets with
dollars looking for buyers, and
these should drive the value of the
dollar down, raise import prices and
reduce the trade deficit. However,
led by China, Asian governments mop
up those dollars and convert them
into Treasury securities and other
U.S. financial assets.
Chinese monetary authorities
purchase dollars in foreign exchange
markets to keep the yuan essentially
fixed at 8.08 per dollar. Other
Asian developing-country governments
support soft pegs by purchasing
dollars. China's currency policy
compels them to do so lest they lose
sales in U.S. markets to China.
Chinese government purchases of
dollars and other securities now
exceed $200 billion per year and 14
percent of China's GDP. Chinese
government purchases of dollars and
other securities create a 35 percent
subsidy on China's exports.
Overall, China and other foreign
governments are purchasing more than
$300 billion a year in U.S,
currency. These purchases create a
17 percent subsidy on the sale of
foreign products in the United
States.
Another factor driving up U.S.
trade deficits has been lopsided
rules WTO rules and the uneven
implementation of trade agreements.
For example, these permit China to
impose investment rules on
multinationals that limit imports of
components and services from the
United States and to subsidize
manufacturing with zero interest
loans and pirate intellectual
property; EU governments to
underwrite manufacturers that
compete with U.S.-based operations;
and most industrialized countries to
rebate value added taxes on their
exports to the United States.
The United States is much more
dependent on personal and corporate
income taxes to finance government
than other countries, whereas the EU
and other industrialized countries
levy substantial value added taxes.
U.S. trading partners may rebate
their value added taxes on exports
and impose these levies on imports.
An arbitrary interpretation of WTO
rules prohibits the United States
from making similar border tax
adjustment on its exports and
imports.
The average standard value added
tax in the EU is 19 percent, and
when rebated on exports and applied
to imports these adjustments provide
a 19 percent subsidy on EU products
sold in U.S. markets and a 19
percent tax on U.S. products sold in
EU markets.
Special and differential
treatment under WTO rules permits
developing countries to maintain
high tariffs and a plethora of other
trade barriers under the guise of
promoting economic growth. These
block U.S. exports of technology
intensive goods and services.
The Doha Round, even if it
reaches a deal on agriculture will
do little to relieve these problems.
Currency manipulation, investment
rules, most subsidies and the
unequal treatment of domestic
taxation are not on the table or
likely to be addressed.
U.S. manufacturers are
particularly hard hit. Cutting the
trade deficit in half would create
nearly 2 million more manufacturing
jobs. An effective policy to end
currency manipulation and cut the
trade deficit would particularly
benefit highly competitive U.S.
durable goods' manufacturers, such
as producers of machine tools,
industrial and construction
machinery, auto parts, and
electronic equipment.
Manufacturing and other
trade-competing industries enjoy
higher productivity and pay higher
wages, and large trade deficits, by
eliminating jobs in manufacturing
and other trade-competing
industries, have pushed down the
wages of workers with only a high
school education or a few years of
college.
Cutting the trade deficit in half
would go a long way toward restoring
the purchasing power of workers hard
hit by wages lagging inflation in
recent years
Longer-term, persistent U.S.
trade deficits are a substantial
drag on U.S. growth. U.S.
import-competing and export
industries spend at least 50 percent
more on R&D and encourage more
investments in skills and education
than other sectors of the economy.
By shifting employment away from
these trade-competing industries,
the trade deficit is reducing U.S.
investments in knowledge-based
industries and skills and
handicapping U.S. growth
Slashing the trade deficit in
half would add more than one
percentage point to U.S. economic
growth each year.
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