

# **IQ and Stock Market Participation\***

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## **ABSTRACT**

An individual's IQ stanine, measured early in adult life, is monotonically related to his stock market participation decision later in life. The high correlation between IQ and participation, which exists even among the 10% most affluent individuals, controls for wealth, income, and other demographic and occupational information. Supplemental data from siblings is used with both an instrumental variables approach and paired difference regressions to show that our results apply to both females and males, and that omitted familial and non-familial variables cannot account for our findings.

Keywords: Intelligence, household finance, stock market participation

JEL classification: G11, D14

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In the U.S., approximately 50% of households invest in the stock market, either directly or indirectly (e.g., via mutual funds in retirement and non-retirement accounts).<sup>1</sup> Participation tends to be even lower in Europe.<sup>2</sup> Such participation rates puzzle economists because non-participation is inconsistent with virtually every neoclassical model of portfolio choice. In these models, everyone invests something in risky stocks because the equity premium is positive and investor preferences are locally risk-neutral at zero risky investment.<sup>3</sup>

We study Finnish stock market participation at the end of 2000 as a function of IQ measured early in adult life. The IQ scores are comprehensive for Finnish males in a 20-year age range because they are obtained on induction into Finland's mandatory military service. We have IQ data on all inductees who took the IQ test between 1982 and 2001, as well as stock registry data that can unambiguously assess whether they own or acquire stock between January 1, 1995 and November 29, 2002. We also have access to data from the year 2000 tax returns of approximately 160,000 of these inductees. These tax returns contain subject-level controls for wealth, income, marital status, children, age, home and foreign asset ownership, primary language, employment status, and occupation (including whether one is an entrepreneur or finance professional). We instrument for education, using zip code level data.

With all controls, probit regression coefficients on IQ stanine dummies exhibit a perfectly monotonic pattern: Individuals with the highest IQ scores are most likely to participate; those with the second highest scores participate more than those with the third highest scores, and so

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<sup>1</sup> See Bucks, Kennickell, and Moore (2009).

<sup>2</sup> See Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008).

<sup>3</sup> See Arrow (1965).

forth. IQ also remains a statistically and economically significant predictor of the participation decision even among the most affluent 10% of individuals. The economic size of the IQ effect is remarkably large—larger than the effect of income on participation.

In part because of the early age at which IQ is measured, one might plausibly believe that the observed correlation between IQ and the regression's control variables arises from IQ's effect on the controls rather than the reverse. In this case, IQ differences account for differences in participation, not only independently from controls like education, wealth, and income, but also by having an influence over these controls. A Fairlie-Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analyzes the channels through which this secondary IQ effect operates. For example, subjects with the second highest IQ stanine have a 36.6% participation rate. By contrast, those in the second lowest IQ stanine have a 10.5% participation rate. About three fifths of the 26.1% difference in participation rates can be explained by differences in the means of the control variables across the two stanines. The decomposition indicates that wealth, education, and income differences are of primary importance.

A vast and rapidly growing literature is debating whether frictions or suboptimal behavior account for non-participation.<sup>4</sup> The resolution of this debate has profound ramifications for modeling the risk-return trade-off. For example, limited participation, driven by the costs of entering the stock market, does not resolve the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott

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<sup>4</sup> Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), using data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, conclude that “inertia and departures from expected-utility maximization” are more promising explanations for non-participation. Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) finds that moderate fixed participation costs can explain the non-participation of many U.S. households. However, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Heaton and Lucas (2000) conclude that fixed participation costs do not explain the significant rate of non-participation among the wealthy. To explain the latter, researchers have turned to lack of awareness about the stock market (Hong, Kubik, and Stein 2004; Guiso and Jappelli 2005), non-standard preferences with agents exhibiting ambiguity aversion (Dow and Werlang 1992; Cao, Wang, and Zhang 2005), lack of education (Campbell 2006; Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini 2007; Christiansen, Joensen, and Rangvid 2008; Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2007), and lack of trust (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008).

(1985) and the low risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989). First, the pricing kernels of the models used to address these puzzles do not account for participation costs. Second, calibrations suggest that the amount of wealth kept out of the market by participation costs is small and therefore unlikely to influence asset prices. By contrast, a sufficient degree of non-participation driven by cognitive limitations could resolve these two puzzles. If some individuals stay out of the market for reasons unrelated to asset prices, then an econometrician can ignore non-participants and estimate asset pricing models by using stockholder consumption data. Stockholder data match the salient features of asset prices because the consumption of stockholders is more volatile and more highly correlated with the excess market return than the consumption of non-participants.<sup>5</sup>

Our findings support cognitive impairment as a key driver of non-participation. Moreover, it can deter large amounts of wealth from entering the stock market. As verification of the latter conclusion, we study the influence of IQ on the participation decisions of affluent individuals. These individuals face costs of participation that are relatively small in comparison to their benefits. If market-based frictions accounted for non-participation, we would not expect IQ to influence the participation of these individuals to any great extent. However, we find that IQ's role in the participation decisions of the affluent is about the same as it is for the less affluent. The definition of affluence—whether net worth or income—does not affect this finding.

Analysis of siblings, identified from historical residential address data, suggests that omitted variables, tied to one's own IQ or to one's family, cannot account for the effect of IQ on participation. For both brothers and sisters, we find that IQ measured from a brother's IQ exam plays a significant role in the subject's stock market participation decision. A proper instrumental

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<sup>5</sup> See Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002), Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) and Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2008).

variables analysis of brothers employing the control function method supports the latter hypothesis. Moreover, brothers' IQ differences explain differences in their participation. By construction, these "difference regressions" control for the influence of family-related factors (including a shared IQ component) on participation.

As a final test of the importance of IQ, we assess the degree to which IQ influences diversification. IQ's role in diversification parallels its role in the participation decision: Controlling for other factors, high IQ individuals are more likely to hold mutual funds and have portfolios with greater numbers of individual stocks.

## I. Data and Summary Statistics

### A. Data Sources

We merge five data sets for our analysis.

**Finnish Central Securities Depository (FCSD) Registry.** This contains the daily portfolios and trades of all Finnish household investors in FCSD-registered stocks (all traded Finnish stocks and all foreign stocks traded on the Helsinki Exchanges) from January 1, 1995 through November 29, 2002. The electronic records we use are exact duplicates of the official certificates of ownership and trades, and hence are very reliable.<sup>6</sup> We analyze the FCSD holdings at the end of 2000, the date that coincides with the 2000 report dates for control variables from our tax data. Participation is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held any FCSD-registered stock on December 31, 2000. Our robustness checks analyze broader

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<sup>6</sup> Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) provide the relevant details about this data set.

definitions of participation, including participation arising from the holding of stock or a mutual fund as of the end of 2000, and whether one purchased stock on or before November 29, 2002. We also use the dataset to determine the number of stocks owned on December 31, 2000 for analysis of diversification.

**FAF Intelligence Assessment.** Around the time of induction into mandatory military duty in the Finnish Armed Forces (FAF), typically at age 19 or 20, and thus generally prior to significant stock trading, males in Finland take a battery of psychological tests to assess which conscripts are most suited for officer training. One portion consists of 120 questions that measure cognitive functioning in three areas: mathematical ability, verbal ability, and logical reasoning, which the FAF aggregates into a composite intelligence score. The FAF composite intelligence score, which we use and refer to as IQ, is standardized to follow the stanine distribution (integers 1 through 9 with 9 being most intelligent). We have test results for all exams that were scored between January 1, 1982 and December 31, 2001.

Compared to other countries, IQ variation in Finland is less likely to reflect differences in culture or environmental factors like schooling that might be related to successful stock market participation. For example, the Finnish school system is remarkably homogeneous: all education, including university education, is free and the quality of education is uniformly high across the country.<sup>7</sup> The country is also racially homogeneous. These factors make it more likely that differences in measured IQ in Finland reflect genuine differences in innate intelligence.

**Finnish Tax Administration Data.** The Finnish Tax Administration (FTA) provides entries from the year 2000 tax returns of all individuals domiciled in the provinces of Uusimaa

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<sup>7</sup> See, for example, a recent article in the Economist (December 6, 2007) and Garmerman (2008).

and East Uusimaa, a region encompassing Greater Helsinki, as well as data from a population registry. Variables constructed from this source include ordinary (labor) income (referred to as “income”), taxable net worth from all sources (referred to as “wealth”), whether one owns various assets (a home, a forest, a mutual fund, or foreign assets), native language (Finnish or Swedish), marital status (single, married, or unmarried but cohabiting), whether one has any dependents under 18 years old, occupation (including whether one is an entrepreneur, farmer, or finance professional), employment status, and year of birth. We also use the gender variable from the FTA data set to obtain a comprehensive sample of females from the two provinces and record observations for the same set of variables described above.

**Finnish Address Data Set.** A supplementary section to the tax return data contains current and historical addresses for all individuals domiciled in the provinces of Uusimaa and East Uusimaa. These data contain each subject’s residence on each day from 1998-2000, the move-in date for the first address in this three-year period, and the move-out date for the last address after this three-year period (up to late 2002). For example, if a person was born on February 7, 1950, moved to a new address on June 10, 1968, and resided there until 2003, the data show the latter address, the June 10 move date, and continual residence between June 10, 1968 and December 31, 2002. All addresses were converted to latitude and longitude coordinates. The coordinates were then translated and rotated with parameters that were destroyed to maintain anonymity.

We use the historical location data to determine brother-brother and brother-sister sibling pairs. Two individuals born within 15 years of one another are siblings if they can be classified as either (i) both moving on the same date to the same location and both moving out of that same location at a later date or (ii) living in a single family dwelling at the same location at some date.

If the latter, we also impose a parent criterion: that either one other person, or exactly two-opposite gendered persons live at the same address at the same date, with the younger of the two persons being at least 18 years older than the oldest member of the sibling pair. We also use transitivity to establish sibling pairs. For example, suppose A and B are siblings, based on the criteria above. If B and C can also be established to be a sibling pair, then A and C is a sibling pair. As an additional criterion for siblings generated by transitivity, we require A and C to share a common adult.<sup>8</sup> Our sample restricts siblings to be 18 or older as of December 31, 2000.

**Finnish Census Data Set.** We employ average education level of adults within the subject's end of 2000 zip code to control for the subject's education. The census data set breaks educational attainment into four categories: basic education which ends at 9<sup>th</sup> grade, vocational education, matriculation (a high-school diploma as determined by passing a college-prep examination at the end of 12<sup>th</sup> grade), and university degree. For each zip code and each of five age groups—18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55 or older—the data set reports what fraction of the age group attained each of these education levels. We estimate the education attained by each individual as the average for their December 31, 2000 age group and zip code of residence.

### *B. Summary Statistics*

Table 1 reports summary statistics on the sample of 158,044 males who took the FAF intelligence test between 1982 and 2001 for whom we have a reliable IQ score, year 2000 tax

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<sup>8</sup> We know these rules establish reliable sibling pairs because when we apply the rules to identify brother-brother pairs, the IQ correlation is 0.40. This correlation is similar to those found in the literature on IQ and families. Herrnstein and Murray (1994), for example, survey the literature and adopt a 60-percent estimate for the heritability of IQ. Bound, Griliches, and Hall (1984) report a brother-brother correlation of 0.44 and brother-sister correlation of 0.48 in the U.S. National Longitudinal Surveys of Young Men and Young Women.

returns, and zip-code level education data. (We later extend our analysis to 4,124 sisters of these subjects.) The data window, combined with the requirement that one enters the military before age 29, implies that subjects in the sample were born between 1953 and 1982. Thus, we lack intelligence data on older individuals. Panel A describes the distribution of IQ scores for the sample used in our regression, for the entire Finnish Armed Forces data set, and the theoretical distribution. Panel B provides the average values of the variables from which we develop regression variables (often as decile-based categorical dummy variables). In addition to reporting the averages for all male subjects in the study, it reports average values based on whether the males participate in the stock market. Panel C describes means of these same variables as a function of IQ.

The third row of Panel A shows that the intelligence scores in our sample are slightly higher than both the theoretical stanine distribution and the scores of males throughout Finland. This is because the FTA (tax) data, from which we derive most of our controls, come from those who reside either in the largest and most urban province in Finland (Uusimaa) or its neighboring province (East Uusimaa). These provinces tend to attract affluent professionals. This mean effect is of little concern as there are sufficiently large sample sizes within each IQ stanine.

Panel B shows that the participant and non-participant groups markedly differ in their IQ scores. Participants' average IQ stanine is almost a full point (about half a standard deviation) above the average for non-participants. Figure 1, which graphs IQ distribution for participants and non-participants, illustrates that the difference in the average IQ scores of participants and non-participants does not arise from a preponderance of IQ scores of any one stanine for either group. There are relatively fewer participants in every below-average IQ stanine and more in every above-average IQ stanine.

Panel B also shows that stock market participants differ from non-participants for all of the variables used to construct regressor controls. Participants have significantly higher labor income. The average stock market participant collects annual wages of 30,341 Euros per year; this is about 50% more than non-participants' average of 20,214 Euros. Similarly, participants are wealthier and have a greater tendency to own homes, forests, and private equity (typically one's own business).

Using zip-code level education data broken down by age groupings, we find that non-participants are more likely to have attained only basic education (less than high school) or vocational education while participants are more likely to have earned a university degree. The other demographic variables, such as employment and marital status, also are related to market participation. Market participants are 1.29 times more likely than non-participants to marry and 1.14 times more likely to have kids. Market participants are five times more likely to work in the finance profession and three times less likely to be unemployed than non-participants.

Panel C, which presents averages for these same variables conditional on IQ stanine, shows that many of these same variables are related to IQ. Income and wealth are almost perfectly monotonic in IQ score. For example, income increases from 16,062 Euros per year for stanine 1 to 31,707 Euros per year for stanine 9. Taxable net worth increases from just 3,627 Euros for the lowest IQ category to 43,619 Euros for the highest IQ category. Using zip-code level data, the proportion of individuals attaining only a basic education monotonically decreases from 24% for the lowest IQ score category to 19% for the highest IQ score category. At the same time, the fraction of individuals with university-level education monotonically increases from 15% to 20% as the IQ stanine increases from 1 to 9. The differences across IQ stanines of other control variables are also notable. The unemployment rate of the lowest IQ stanine is about 10

times higher than the rate observed among those with the highest IQ stanine. The homeownership rate increases from 28% to 43%; the marriage rate goes from 22% to 33%; and the fraction of people working in the finance profession increases from 0% to about 2% as we move from the least intelligent category to the most intelligent. Most notable, however, is that the stock market participation rate increases perfectly monotonically: from 8% for stanine 1 to 41% for stanine 9. Figure 2 illustrates that this finding is robust even when we control for wealth. It plots the participation rate against IQ stanine and net worth. Participation is largely monotonic in both variables.

## **II. Regression Results**

### *A. Probit Regressions of Participation Decisions on IQ*

Some of the relationships documented in Table 1 diminish or disappear when controlled for in a full multivariate setting. For this reason, our primary analysis makes use of regression to address the issue of the marginal effects of IQ. Because the participation outcome is binary, we use probit methodology to estimate the regression coefficients and compute their test statistics.

Table 2 reports estimates from two probit regressions. The table includes probit coefficients, test statistics (from zip-code clustered residuals), and marginal participation rate effects (at the average values of non-IQ regressors) for regressions of a stock market participation dummy against IQ and a host of control variables. As described earlier, the participation variable is one if an individual holds FCSD stocks at the end of 2000 and zero otherwise. The “IQ dummy specification,” observed in the first three columns, employs dummies for each IQ stanine. The dummy for the highest IQ score, stanine 9, serves as the omitted

category. The 1,522.9 Wald statistic at the bottom of the first column tests whether the participation rate of the highest IQ stanine differs from the other eight stanines. The critical chi-squared value of the Wald statistic using the 0.001 significance level is 26.1. Note that the effect of IQ on participation is perfectly monotonic. Individuals with the lowest IQ score are less likely to own stock than individuals with the second lowest IQ scores, who in turn are less likely to own stock than individuals with the third lowest IQ scores, and so forth. The economic significance is equally impressive. The marginal effects column indicates that the lowest IQ individuals have a participation rate that is 17.6 percentage points less than that of the highest IQ individuals. The “linear IQ specification,” reported in the three rightmost columns of Table 2, explores the alternative specification with IQ stanine as a single variable. Not surprisingly, the results and their interpretation are highly similar to those for categorical dummy specification in the first three columns.

The regression control variables are described in the prior data section. They include educational attainment proxies, cohort fixed effects,<sup>9</sup> as well as dummy variables for income decile, wealth decile, certain types of wealth ownership and occupations, native language, marital status, and employment status. A few of these variables have previously been used in the participation literature. Many of the explanatory variables are highly significant. For example, individuals in income deciles 1-9 are significantly less likely to be stock market participants than the highest income subjects in decile 10. Moreover, the coefficients are impressive. For example, the marginal effects column for the IQ dummy (left) specification indicates that the highest income decile (omitted) has a participation rate that is 4.7 percentage points greater than any

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<sup>9</sup> Korniotis and Kumar (2009) relate age to investment skill.

other decile, keeping other observables, including wealth, fixed. Unemployed individuals have a participation rate that is 10.5 percentage points lower than employed individuals. Finance professionals' participation rate is 14.1 percentage points greater than those employed in other professions. With the linear IQ specification, individuals in the highest income category have a 9.0 percentage point greater participation rate than those in the lowest income decile; the marginal effects of being employed or being a finance professional are similar to those from the IQ dummy specification.

As impressive as the coefficients on many of the controls are, the most striking coefficients largely belong to IQ. In the IQ dummy specification, the marginal effects and probit coefficients of the two lowest stanines (about 10% of the sample) are about 50% larger, on average, than the corresponding impact from being in the lowest income decile. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that the IQ test is just 120 questions and, for most subjects, the test is taken many years before participation is analyzed. Income, by contrast, is measured contemporaneously with participation and is deemed to be highly reliable because there are civil and criminal penalties associated with false reporting. Wealth seems to be relatively more important, but this might be accounted for by participation causing wealth: the 1990s were a good decade for holding Finnish stocks.

Neoclassical theories of participation, such as those in Vissing-Jørgensen (2002, 2003), argue that even modest costs of participation can deter participation for less wealthy individuals. This is because the dollar benefits of participation are small when there is little at stake in the markets. If we take these theories literally, and assume no measurement error, misspecification, or endogeneity biases, we would expect to see a wealth effect on participation only at the lower wealth levels. The fact that net worth deciles eight, nine, and ten are far more likely to participate

than others is inconsistent with a participation cost theory. Of course, we do not live in such a perfect econometric world. As just one example, Vissing-Jørgensen (2003, pp. 179-180) hypothesizes that participation costs may be decreasing in cognitive ability. To the extent that measured wealth is correlated with deviations of true IQ from measured IQ, we might expect to see a more positive wealth effect on participation, even at higher wealth levels.

If the participation decision is determined by comparisons of the cost of participation with wealth, stock market participants' marginal utility of consumption may be less relevant for asset pricing. In this case, the asset pricing equation contains an added term for the participation cost constraint that traditional models do not account for. On the other hand, if IQ is more relevant, those who participate constitute a segmented market—with the participant segment being fully rational (as captured by a first order condition) and the non-participating segment driven by behavioral forces. In the latter case, it is the participants' volatility of consumption that dictates asset prices. Our measure of cognitive ability remains a salient determinant of participation in comparison to the control variables—lending credence to a theory of participation and asset pricing based on cognitive segmentation.

Punctuating the importance of IQ in relation to the controls are results from a third unreported specification that replaces the linear IQ specification's wealth decile dummies with wealth. In the third specification, the coefficient on IQ is .028 and the coefficient on wealth is  $2.4 \times 10^{-6}$ , generating a ratio of 11,491. Thus, each one stanine drop in IQ, which corresponds to half a standard deviation drop in ability, is equivalent to an 11,491 Euro decline in taxable net worth.

### *B. Participation Decisions of Affluent Individuals*

If fixed participation costs rationally deter participation, calibrations of these costs within neoclassical models imply that they deter only the poor.<sup>10</sup> Cochrane (2007) points out that when participation costs have this feature, they have little effect on asset pricing because they deter only a negligible amount of wealth from participating the stock market.

Curcuro, Heaton, Lucas, and Moore (2004) and Campbell (2006) observe that the degree of non-participation among wealthy individuals is puzzling. They reason that participation costs cannot plausibly explain such non-participation and other mechanisms that might account for this phenomenon have not been verified empirically. We add to this debate by offering a convincing mechanism that keeps even the affluent from participating in the stock market.

Limiting our analysis to the most affluent individuals in the sample lends credence to any conclusions about whether cognitive deficits might plausibly explain non-participation decisions. Affluent individuals should not be constrained by any fixed cost or minimum investment barriers of entry to the stock market. Another motivation is that one cannot explain IQ-related non-participation of the affluent as a spurious consequence of noisy measurement of income or wealth controls. It would take an implausibly large amount of measurement error to misclassify those too poor to rationally bear participation costs as belonging to the 10% most affluent class. Even if such misclassification occurs in rare instances, one would not expect errors-in-variables or related estimation biases to account for IQ coefficients of the magnitude observed in Table 2.

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<sup>10</sup> For example, see Vissing-Jørgensen (2002, 2003).

Table 3 employs the probit regression methodology of Table 2 to estimate the participation regressions for affluent individuals. Panel A restricts the sample to subjects with ordinary income in the top decile; Panel B restricts it to those with taxable net worth in the top decile. For obvious reasons, the former regression omits income decile controls and the latter omits wealth decile controls in contrast to Table 2's regressions.

Both definitions of affluence lead to the same conclusion: IQ significantly predicts participation, even among these most affluent individuals. For the IQ dummy specification, the IQ coefficient pattern remains almost perfectly monotonic. The economic significance column indicates that the participation rate for the lowest IQ stanine is 14.3% lower than the rate of the highest IQ stanine for the income-affluent specification and 23.2% lower for the wealth-affluent specification. Although the sample is smaller, which tends to increase estimation error, the coefficients for the low IQ stanine dummies in Table 3 are similar those for the full sample in Table 2. These results speak to IQ's important role in the participation decisions of the most affluent individuals.

### *C. Secondary Channels for IQ*

Table 2's regressions demonstrate that IQ's influence over stock market participation does not arise from any correlation it has with our measures of income, wealth, education, and a host of other control variables. However, IQ clearly influences most of these variables. Hence, there are secondary channels through which IQ may influence participation. For example, a high IQ individual is more likely to be married, have a high income, be wealthy, and have children. By virtue of these secondary channels, the individual may choose to invest in the stock market.

Those with high income may desire to save and feel more comfortable about taking on risk. Those with children might want to provide for their future. To assess the degree to which IQ influences participation via secondary channels, Table 4 presents results from a Fairlie-Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.<sup>11</sup> Panel A presents results on control variables that partially account for the 32.7% difference in participation rates between IQ stanines 1 and 9 while Panel B presents results on control variables that partially account for the 26.1% difference in participation between IQ stanines 2 and 8. While any pairing of stanines can be analyzed with this approach, we focus on the pairing of two extremes—the stanine 1, 9 and 2, 8 pairings—for brevity.

The decomposition is derived in the following manner: First, we repeat Table 2's regression, but omit the IQ regressor(s). This regression yields control variable coefficients and predicted  $z$ -scores for each stanine group. Predicted  $z$ -scores, the summed product of the regression coefficients and the group means for the control variables, are then translated into predicted participation rates. The technique additionally computes the marginal effect of group mean differences for seven natural collections of the control variables. For a given stanine pairing, marginal effects are the sequence of changes in predicted participation rates obtained by sequentially changing each control variable collection's value (a vector) from its group mean at the lower stanine to its mean at the higher stanine. Sequencing of the changes in the seven collections of control variables must be randomized, repeated, and averaged, and members must be paired across the two stanines, to obtain marginal changes in participation rates and test statistics. For details, see Fairlie (2005).

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<sup>11</sup> See Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973), and Fairlie (1999, 2005).

Table 4 Panel A indicates that group mean differences in the control variables account for almost two thirds (.630) of the 32.7% difference in participation rates between stanines 1 and 9. There is a 7% difference in participation that can be explained by differences in wealth between the stanines (holding other control variables fixed), a 6% difference that can be explained by education differences alone, a 5% difference that can be explained by income alone, and a 2% difference that can be explained by profession and employment status dummies. The remaining control variables have far less effect either because the group means scarcely differ between stanines 1 and 9 or because group mean differences have little influence on participation.

Panel B of Table 4 leads to similar findings. Approximately three fifths of the 27% difference in participation between stanines 2 and 8 can be explained by group mean differences in the control variables. This 16% difference in predicted participation rates is largely accounted for by group differences in wealth (5%), education (4%), and income (4%), with the remainder (2%) explained by group mean differences in all the other control variables.

In addition to being interesting in their own right, the decomposition has relevance for studies that lack the rich IQ data we have. Conclusions in such studies about the importance of wealth, income, or education on participation cannot easily be disentangled from an omitted IQ variable. By contrast, studies suggesting that age, marital status, or parental status influence participation are less likely to have alternative interpretations related to IQ.

#### *D. Addressing Endogeneity Biases: Evidence from Sibling Control Function Regressions*

The geographic location data, described earlier, identify 1,997 pairs of brothers among the subjects used for Table 2's regressions. Because of the nature of the historical address data

set and the requirement that siblings be at least 18 years of age, the sibling sample is far smaller than the sample of 158,044 subjects from our prior analysis. The ability to match brothers offers a unique opportunity to address potential endogeneity bias in Table 2's results. In a setting with endogeneity, IQ's effect on participation can be viewed as estimation of a stylized pair of structural equations

$$participation(j) = b_0 + b_1*IQ(j) + b_2*observed\ controls(j) + b_3*unobservable\ controls(j) + e(j),$$

$$unobservable\ controls(j) = c_0 + c_1*IQ(j) + d(j).$$

Inconsistent estimates of the coefficient vector  $b_1$  arise from the correlation between the unobservable controls and one's actual IQ. Following Heckman (1978, 1979), and developed further by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and Petrin and Train (2009), one corrects for the inconsistency by adding the control function residual  $s(j)$ , obtained from an OLS regression of own IQ on brother's IQ, to the first regression. That is, inserting  $s(j)$  from the OLS regression

$$IQ(j) = d_0 + d_1*IQ\ brother\ (j) + s(j)$$

into the first regression,

$$participation(j) = b_0 + b_1*IQ(j) + b_2*observed\ controls(j) + b_3*unobservable\ controls(j) + b_4*s(j) + e(j),$$

leads to consistent estimates of  $b_1$  and  $b_2$ .  $t$ -values are estimated using the jackknife estimators of the  $b$ 's so that we account for estimation error in the first stage computation of  $s(j)$ . The control function approach can only be used for the linear IQ specification because the first stage control function residual needs to come from a linear projection.

Table 5's coefficient estimate on IQ, 0.279, is statistically significant, and more than three times larger than the coefficient in Table 2. The significant IQ coefficient here suggests that IQ score does not spuriously predict stock market participation because of some omitted variable that is a linear function of IQ stanine.

The control function method can rule out inconsistent IQ coefficient estimates arising from omitted variables that would be influenced by own IQ. However, a significant IQ coefficient with the control function method can be caused by a family variable that is not influenced by one's idiosyncratic IQ component. Indeed, the large coefficient on IQ in Table 5 in comparison to Table 2 suggests that there is a substantial family component to participation that is related to IQ.

#### *E. IQ Influence on the Participation of Females*

The geographic location and move-in/move-out dates in the Finnish tax data, described earlier, also identify 4,124 sisters of the males from the full sample. Table 6 reports results on participation and IQ for these females. Although we lack data on female IQ because they do not serve in the FAF, we can substitute for the missing data. The regression specifications are identical to those in Table 2, except that in place of the female's IQ stanine dummy or IQ score, we employ brother's IQ stanine dummy or IQ score. The IQ coefficients in Table 6 are of slightly smaller magnitude than the comparable coefficients in Table 2, but are still statistically significant. For example, in the linear specification on the right, the IQ coefficient has a  $z$ -statistic of 3.30. This suggests that the component of IQ that sisters share with brothers is a potent predictor of participation.

In contrast to the control function approach of Table 5, substituting a sibling's IQ for one's own generates a biased estimate of the coefficient on own IQ. This bias can overstate or understate the effect of IQ on participation for the sisters, even assuming that gender does not influence the relationship between the shared family component of IQ and participation. The direction of the bias depends on the degree to which the family component of IQ influences participation in comparison to the degree to which family IQ is a noisy predictor of own IQ. One cannot appropriately assess the bias by comparing Table 6's coefficients with Table 2's because the samples in these two tables differ so much. Gender differences alone may account for differences in IQ coefficient(s) and the Table 6 sample is younger because of the method used to identify siblings.

A more appropriate assessment of the bias in Table 6's coefficients can be found from a comparison of Panels A and B in Table 7. Table 7 repeats Table 6 for the subsample of data consisting of Table 5's 1,997 brother pairs. Panel A reports results for brother pairs where, in place of own IQ, we use brother's IQ, while Panel B repeats the Table 2 regression on the subsample, using own IQ as the key regressor. Each brother in the pair appears as a data point, doubling the sample size to 3,994 subjects. The coefficients in Panel A are slightly larger than those in Panel B. For example, the coefficient on IQ in the linear specification is 0.105 when we use one's brother's IQ as the regressor, and 0.097 when own IQ is the regressor. However, the difference is negligible, suggesting that any bias in Table 6's sister estimation of the IQ effect is probably small. The negligible difference also reinforces our earlier conclusion that there is a strong shared IQ component within families that influences participation.

*F. Addressing Omitted Family Background Biases Using Sibling Difference Regressions*

Tables 5, 6, and 7 suggest that IQ components that are shared within a family are important predictors of participation. This raises an important issue. To what extent is participation determined by the component of IQ that is not shared within a family? Shared IQ components within a family may also proxy for inheritances or family environment, casting doubt on the role that native IQ may play in the participation decision. Table 8 tackles this issue by looking at differences in sibling participation based on differences in IQ.

Table 8's participation regression is estimated from data on the 1,997 brother pairs from Tables 5 and 7. For each dependent and independent variable, we difference the sibling values within the pair to remove any unobserved family effects or environmental factors. The benefit of this differencing approach, compared to a fixed effects approach, is that it allows for the possibility that family background is correlated with all or some of the observables in the participation regression. For example, Chiteji and Stafford (1999) find that parental stock market participation alters the likelihood of child participation.<sup>12</sup> Charles and Hurst (2003) document a significant intergenerational correlation in wealth and suggest that family members share similar savings preferences. The differencing approach used in Table 8 eliminates all "within family" omitted variables, including shared family knowledge about investment opportunities, as potential explanations for IQ's effect on participation. Indeed, Table 8's differencing method is a well-accepted method for removing unobserved family effects in sibling studies, as exemplified by Geronimus and Korenman (1992) and Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994).

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<sup>12</sup> Vissing-Jørgensen (2003) observes that within-family education about stock market "matters" may underlie this finding.

Table 8 Panel A demonstrates that differences in IQ between brothers do not significantly predict differences in participation. This is true whether the differences in IQ are measured as differences in the IQ stanine dummies (left side of Panel A) or as differences in the IQ scores themselves. However, this result arises because the subsample of brother pairs is relatively small and young compared to the larger sample in Table 2. The average age in the Table 8 sample is 7.34 years younger than the average age in Table 2. Many brother pairs where one brother is vastly smarter than the other have identical stockholdings. This suggests that parental gifts contribute to noisy estimation of the participation dummy. To address this issue, Panel B reruns the same regression but defines participation as having purchased stock between 1995 and 2002. The relationship between IQ and this alternative definition of participation is far stronger and statistically significant. This result suggests that even if the relationship between IQ and participation has a family component, the component of IQ that is orthogonal to that family component also determines participation.

### *G. Robustness: Alternative Definitions of Participation*

There is no obvious way to best measure whether a subject has decided to invest in stock. In cases like Table 8, where there are material differences in the results arising from differing definitions of participation, the paper reports detailed data outlining the differences and outlines reasons that might explain the difference. However, no reader should endure largely redundant results from multiple definitions of participation. For the sake of brevity, we selected one primary definition of participation, which is reflected in our tables. We summarize results with other definitions below.

The Table 2 results for both specifications are largely the same if we broaden the definition of participation. If we define the stock market participation variable to be one if a subject holds a mutual fund or individual stocks or both, the probit coefficients are again monotonic in IQ and of similar magnitude to those reported in Table 2. Unfortunately, the tax data from the FTA contain information about whether an individual held any mutual fund at the end of 2000, but do not identify which mutual fund an investor holds. Some of the funds held are money market and bond funds. However, given the preponderance of mutual fund accounts in equity mutual funds,<sup>13</sup> we are reassured about the robustness of our findings with the results from this broader definition of participation.

Earlier, we also saw that differences in active purchases of stocks were influenced by differences in IQ between brother pairs. If we redefine participation as a dummy that is one if the subject purchased stock between 1995 and 2002, and rerun Table 2's regression on the entire sample, we obtain even stronger results than in Table 2.

#### *H. The Effect of IQ on Diversification*

The evidence presented so far indicates that cognitive impairment prevents some individuals from holding stock. If this is the case, cognitive impairment may play a role in other financial decisions. Table 9 investigates whether IQ plays a role in diversification. We employ two measures of diversification using the subsample of subjects that hold at least one individual stock. Panel A focuses on whether a subject holds a mutual fund. Panel B analyzes negative

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<sup>13</sup> According to *Finnish Mutual Fund Report December 2000*, 94% of the mutual fund accounts in Finland were in equity mutual funds or balanced funds.

binomial regressions that explain the number of stocks held.

The analysis of whether a mutual fund is held is a binary decision. The specification and methodology used to study this issue is identical to Table 2, but the dependent variable is determined by whether the subject holds a mutual fund, as reported on his year 2000 tax return. Panel A of Table 9 suggests that IQ significantly predicts whether a subject holds a mutual fund, controlling for other factors. The effect is monotonic in IQ as evidenced by the coefficients for the IQ dummy specification and highly significant.

Panel B of Table 9 focuses on the issue of diversification, as measured by the number of stocks held. Negative binomial regression, an extension of Poisson regression, is employed here using the same regressors as Panel A. It, too, shows that diversification, as defined by the number of stocks held, is influenced by cognitive impairment. In both specifications, those with lower IQ hold fewer stocks, controlling for income, wealth, education, and the other controls discussed earlier. The IQ coefficients in the IQ dummy specification on the left of Table 9 Panel B are almost perfectly monotonic and generally highly significant. The significance and magnitude of the IQ coefficient in the linear IQ specification is equally impressive. All of this leads to a conclusion that even among those who hold stocks, low IQ investors are likely to hold more poorly diversified portfolios.

### **III. Conclusion**

An individual's IQ stanine, measured early in adult life, is monotonically related to his stock market participation later in life. The high correlation between IQ and participation, which exists even among the 10% most affluent individuals, controls for wealth, income, and other

demographic and occupational information. The economic size of the IQ effect is remarkably large: Controlling for each subject's observable characteristics, the participation rate for individuals in the lowest IQ stanine is 17.6% lower than what it is for individuals at the other end of the IQ spectrum. This IQ effect is far larger than the effect of income on participation and it generalizes to females. Instrumenting for IQ with brother's scores does not alter our conclusions, suggesting that omitted variables bias is not relevant here—at least for any omitted variable that is caused by own IQ, such as permanent income. Difference regressions between brothers also suggest that there is an own-IQ effect on participation that is separate from a family effect. Finally, IQ is an important driver of diversification.

In addition to the robustness tests reported in the body of the paper, we also verified that IQ's influence on participation is similar across stratifications of the sample based on predictions of participation that are not tied to IQ. This “propensity score approach” involves a two-step regression procedure.<sup>14</sup> First, for the entire sample, we estimate Table 2's regression without IQ regressors and sort the sample into quintiles based on the regression's predicted participation, which derive entirely from the controls and age fixed effects. Second, for each of the five quintile subsamples of subjects, we then run a regression of participation against IQ (or IQ dummies). For both the IQ-dummy and linear IQ specifications, the IQ slope estimates across the quintiles are very close to one another. This suggests that IQ's influence on participation is unlikely to be altered by the levels of the control variables employed in the first step.

It is difficult to argue that omitted variables bias or errors in variables bias is the culprit behind the significant IQ coefficients and that innate cognitive ability per se plays no role in

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<sup>14</sup> See, for example, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).

participation. We use difference regressions to control for family effects, address endogeneity biases with control function techniques, and employ an enormous number of controls from the tax data set. It is truly difficult to believe that the usual suspects could overturn our major findings. The fact that 120 questions from an IQ test taken years before we measure participation explains as much if not more than contemporaneous controls like income in so many contexts is truly remarkable.

Paradoxically, our finding that cognitive impairment leads to behavior that violates the principles of neoclassical economics helps justify recent neoclassical approaches to asset pricing theory. Neoclassically-inspired models that explain the equity risk premium puzzle from the consumption of stock market participants have been criticized for failing to explain what drives participation. For example, limited participation stemming from the costs of entering the stock market is either inconsistent with the pricing kernels of these models or represents a negligible fraction of wealth. Our finding that cognitive impairment prevents many of the wealthy from participating in the stock market renders these comments moot. Moreover, it suggests that the consumption of smarter individuals, rather than the wealthy, may be what drives the pricing kernel. This latter conclusion is not currently featured in formal neoclassical models of asset pricing. However, it is consistent with neoclassical folk wisdom—that economic behavior, divorced from utility optimization, is irrelevant for market efficiency because savvy investors determine asset prices.

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
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
**Figure 1: Distribution of IQ Score Conditional on Market Participation**

Figure 1 plots IQ score distributions for stock market participants and non-participants. An individual is a stock market participant if he held individual stocks registered with the FCSD at the end of 2000.



**Figure 2: Average Participation Rate Conditional on IQ Score and Net Worth Decile**

Figure 2 plots stock market participation rates as function of IQ stanine and net worth decile for all subjects with positive net worth. An individual is a stock market participant if he held individual stocks registered with the FCSD at the end of 2000. Net worth is from the 2000 Finnish tax dataset.



**Table 1****Descriptive statistics**

Panel A reports the distribution of IQ scores. Panels B and C report mean values for variables used in regression analyses. See the text for descriptions of the variables. Panel B reports means sorted by participation and Panel C reports means sorted by IQ score. Participation is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held individual stocks registered with the FCSD at the end of 2000. Income and wealth variables in Panel B are from the 2000 Finnish tax dataset. Education variables are derived from the Finnish Census Data Set using each individual's age and zip code. Other demographic and occupation information are from the tax data.

## Panel A: Distribution of IQ score

Sample	IQ score									N
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Theoretical Stanine Distribution	4.0%	7.0%	12.0%	17.0%	20.0%	17.0%	12.0%	7.0%	4.0%	
Full IQ Score Data Set	5.2%	9.3%	9.5%	18.4%	21.0%	18.0%	9.1%	5.6%	3.8%	586,187
Uusimaa / East Uusimaa	3.5%	6.8%	7.6%	15.8%	21.0%	20.2%	11.4%	7.7%	6.0%	158,044

Panel B: Mean socioeconomic characteristics by stock market participation

	All	Stock Market Participant	
		No	Yes
IQ	5.25	5.02	5.97
Education			
Basic	21.6%	22.4%	19.3%
Vocational	42.6%	43.2%	40.9%
Matricular	18.8%	18.8%	19.0%
University	16.9%	15.7%	20.8%
Ordinary Income, EUR	22,642	20,214	30,341
Ordinary Income, Log-Growth	11.8%	11.8%	12.0%
Wealth			
Taxable home wealth > 0	37.7%	32.0%	55.5%
Taxable forest wealth > 0	1.3%	1.0%	2.2%
Taxable foreign wealth > 0	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
Taxable private equity > 0	2.6%	2.1%	4.1%
Taxable net worth, EUR	11,193	3,036	37,051
Other Demographics			
Swedish	7.0%	6.7%	8.1%
Married	29.6%	27.6%	35.7%
Cohabiter	6.5%	6.8%	5.4%
Kids	29.8%	28.8%	33.0%
Occupation			
Entrepreneur	2.8%	2.7%	3.0%
Farmer	0.9%	0.7%	1.4%
Finance professional	0.7%	0.4%	1.8%
Unemployed	8.6%	10.3%	3.1%
Number of observations	158,044	120,143	37,901

Panel C: Mean socioeconomic characteristics by IQ score

	IQ score									All
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Stock Market Participant	8.0%	10.5%	14.1%	16.8%	22.1%	28.0%	32.6%	36.6%	40.7%	24.0%
Education										
Basic	23.8%	23.6%	23.2%	22.9%	22.0%	21.2%	20.2%	19.5%	18.6%	21.6%
Vocational	47.5%	46.5%	45.9%	44.4%	43.1%	41.7%	40.3%	39.0%	37.2%	42.6%
Matricular	14.1%	15.1%	16.0%	17.3%	18.4%	19.6%	20.9%	22.1%	24.0%	18.8%
University	14.6%	14.8%	14.9%	15.3%	16.5%	17.5%	18.6%	19.5%	20.2%	16.9%
Ordinary Income, EUR	16,062	17,666	18,427	19,640	21,413	23,874	26,171	28,191	31,707	22,642
Ordinary Income, Log-Growth	7.1%	7.4%	8.3%	11.0%	11.5%	13.3%	13.4%	14.3%	16.1%	11.8%
Wealth										
Taxable home wealth > 0	27.9%	31.4%	34.0%	34.8%	37.6%	40.1%	40.8%	42.1%	42.8%	37.7%
Taxable forest wealth > 0	1.2%	1.4%	1.2%	1.3%	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.3%
Taxable foreign wealth > 0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%
Taxable private equity > 0	1.8%	2.1%	2.3%	2.4%	2.4%	2.8%	3.0%	3.0%	3.3%	2.6%
Taxable net worth, EUR	3,627	4,655	7,393	6,730	9,231	9,575	12,019	16,340	43,619	11,193
Other Demographics										
Swedish	6.6%	7.4%	10.0%	5.9%	6.7%	6.9%	6.5%	6.9%	8.4%	7.0%
Married	22.5%	25.7%	25.8%	27.0%	29.3%	31.7%	32.0%	34.0%	33.2%	29.6%
Cohabiter	10.1%	10.0%	9.4%	8.0%	6.8%	5.3%	4.3%	3.7%	2.8%	6.5%
Kids	29.7%	32.0%	31.7%	30.5%	30.2%	29.8%	28.3%	28.5%	26.6%	29.8%
Occupation										
Entrepreneur	3.2%	3.6%	3.2%	2.9%	2.7%	2.6%	2.4%	2.5%	2.6%	2.8%
Farmer	1.1%	1.1%	1.2%	0.9%	1.0%	0.8%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.9%
Finance professional	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	0.6%	0.9%	1.2%	1.7%	1.6%	0.7%
Unemployed	22.4%	16.7%	13.8%	11.3%	8.3%	6.0%	4.2%	3.4%	2.2%	8.6%
Number of observations	5,552	10,749	12,002	25,040	33,124	31,943	17,958	12,145	9,531	158,044

**Table 2****IQ Scores and Stock Market Participation**

Table 2 reports summary data from probit regressions of stock market participation on IQ stanine dummies (or IQ score) and a host of control variables (described in the body of the paper) derived from the Finnish tax data and the Finnish census data set. Participation is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held individual stocks registered with the FCSD. Pseudo *R*-squared and sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered by zip code. For each of two specifications, the columns report coefficients from the probit regression, associated *z*-values, and marginal effects on participation probability (evaluated at the average value of other regressors, except for IQ stanine dummies, which are evaluated at zero). The marginal effects for indicator variables indicate the shift in the participation probability when the indicator variable changes from zero to one. The dummy variable associated with the highest category—IQ stanine 9, university-level education, highest ordinary income, and taxable net worth in the highest decile—are omitted and serve as a benchmark. Taxable net worth deciles are computed after removing individuals with no taxable net worth. A dummy variable, no net worth, identifies the latter individuals. The regressions also contain 30 (unreported) cohort fixed effects for birth years 1953 through 1982.

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>IQ stanine</i>				0.086	37.48	0.024
Lowest	-0.683	-23.00	-0.176			
2	-0.572	-23.86	-0.155			
3	-0.439	-19.28	-0.126			
4	-0.360	-19.92	-0.107			
5	-0.251	-14.64	-0.077			
6	-0.139	-8.17	-0.045			
7	-0.072	-4.06	-0.024			
8	-0.028	-1.44	-0.009			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	-0.006	-5.02	-0.002	-0.006	-5.08	-0.002
Vocational	-0.016	-13.42	-0.005	-0.016	-13.28	-0.005
Matricular	0.000	-0.06	0.000	0.000	-0.18	0.000
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	-0.285	-8.61	-0.087	-0.286	-8.62	-0.071
Lowest	-0.365	-17.38	-0.111	-0.366	-17.36	-0.090
2	-0.450	-20.58	-0.133	-0.450	-20.58	-0.108
3	-0.458	-21.72	-0.135	-0.459	-21.72	-0.109
4	-0.522	-29.54	-0.151	-0.524	-29.44	-0.122
5	-0.541	-28.99	-0.155	-0.543	-29.11	-0.125
6	-0.476	-24.68	-0.139	-0.476	-24.73	-0.113
7	-0.389	-23.76	-0.117	-0.387	-23.63	-0.095
8	-0.285	-16.38	-0.089	-0.283	-16.30	-0.072
9	-0.147	-9.04	-0.047	-0.144	-8.88	-0.039
Income Log-Growth Rate	0.023	2.94	0.008	0.023	2.93	0.007
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	0.193	17.27	0.065	0.193	17.36	0.056
Forest	-0.068	-1.46	-0.022	-0.068	-1.47	-0.019
Private equity	-0.070	-3.05	-0.023	-0.070	-3.06	-0.019
Foreign assets excluding equity	0.378	1.72	0.138	0.379	1.73	0.123
<i>Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.548	-52.65	-0.552	-1.546	-52.34	-0.518
Lowest	-0.865	-24.09	-0.209	-0.861	-23.85	-0.162
2	-0.683	-19.66	-0.179	-0.681	-19.49	-0.140
3	-0.735	-23.02	-0.188	-0.734	-22.90	-0.147
4	-0.768	-22.48	-0.194	-0.766	-22.38	-0.151
5	-0.785	-24.28	-0.197	-0.784	-24.14	-0.153
6	-0.717	-22.60	-0.185	-0.716	-22.42	-0.145
7	-0.676	-20.25	-0.178	-0.675	-20.14	-0.139
8	-0.568	-17.69	-0.156	-0.568	-17.63	-0.124
9	-0.394	-12.53	-0.116	-0.392	-12.43	-0.093
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	0.028	1.30	0.010	0.027	1.24	0.008
Married	0.010	0.65	0.003	0.010	0.64	0.003
Cohabitor	0.017	0.73	0.006	0.015	0.65	0.004
Kids	-0.099	-6.36	-0.033	-0.098	-6.29	-0.027
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur	-0.053	-2.20	-0.018	-0.056	-2.29	-0.015
Farmer	-0.110	-1.89	-0.036	-0.111	-1.90	-0.030
Finance professional	0.386	9.25	0.141	0.386	9.23	0.125
Unemployed	-0.344	-19.23	-0.105	-0.347	-19.38	-0.086
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability			0.278			0.203
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	1,522.9					
Pseudo R-squared	0.1848			0.1843		
N	158,044			158,044		

**Table 3****IQ Scores and Stock Market Participation of Affluent Individuals**

Table 3 reports summary data from probit regressions of stock market participation on IQ stanine dummies (or IQ score) and a host of control variables (described in the body of the paper) derived from the Finnish tax data and the Finnish census data set. The sample is restricted to the 10% most affluent individuals in the data set. Panel A restricts the sample to the 10% of individuals with the largest ordinary income for 2000 as reported on their tax returns. Panel B restricts the sample to the 10% of individuals with the largest taxable net worth as reported on their year 2000 tax returns. Participation is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held individual stocks registered with the FCSD. Pseudo *R*-squared and sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered by zip code. For each of two specifications, the columns report coefficients from the probit regression, associated *z*-values, and marginal effects on participation probability (evaluated at the average value of other regressors, except for IQ stanine dummies, which are evaluated at zero). The marginal effects for indicator variables indicate the shift in the participation probability when the indicator variable changes from zero to one. The dummy variable associated with the highest category—IQ stanine 9, university-level education, highest ordinary income, and taxable net worth in the highest decile—are omitted and serve as a benchmark. Taxable net worth deciles are computed after removing individuals with no taxable net worth. A dummy variable, no net worth, identifies the latter individuals. The regressions also contain 30 (unreported) cohort fixed effects for birth years 1953 through 1982.

## Panel A: Ordinary Income in Top 10% of the Distribution

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z -values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z -values	Marginal Effects
<i>IQ stanine</i>				0.051	7.31	0.020
Lowest	-0.364	-2.32	-0.143			
2	-0.646	-6.25	-0.245			
3	-0.338	-4.13	-0.133			
4	-0.238	-4.76	-0.094			
5	-0.132	-3.30	-0.053			
6	-0.031	-0.77	-0.012			
7	-0.046	-1.15	-0.018			
8	-0.010	-0.26	-0.004			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	-0.004	-1.40	-0.001	-0.004	-1.39	-0.001
Vocational	-0.014	-5.53	-0.005	-0.014	-5.50	-0.005
Matricular	0.001	0.23	0.000	0.001	0.28	0.001
Income Log-Growth Rate	0.036	0.90	0.014	0.030	0.74	0.012
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	0.220	9.04	0.088	0.220	9.03	0.088
Forest	0.006	0.06	0.002	0.006	0.06	0.002
Private equity	-0.012	-0.24	-0.005	-0.016	-0.32	-0.006
Foreign assets excluding equity	0.507	1.53	0.191	0.515	1.49	0.197
<i>Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.225	-26.53	-0.456	-1.218	-26.49	-0.457
Lowest	-0.880	-10.67	-0.319	-0.873	-10.56	-0.308
2	-0.687	-8.44	-0.260	-0.690	-8.43	-0.255
3	-0.733	-9.92	-0.275	-0.729	-9.87	-0.268
4	-0.806	-10.39	-0.299	-0.796	-10.28	-0.288
5	-0.761	-10.89	-0.285	-0.755	-10.85	-0.276
6	-0.662	-9.31	-0.252	-0.656	-9.23	-0.245
7	-0.609	-8.06	-0.234	-0.602	-7.95	-0.227
8	-0.503	-8.17	-0.196	-0.498	-8.08	-0.191
9	-0.352	-6.25	-0.139	-0.347	-6.15	-0.136
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	0.060	1.34	0.024	0.054	1.18	0.021
Married	-0.033	-0.86	-0.013	-0.031	-0.81	-0.012
Cohabitor	0.047	0.75	0.019	0.041	0.66	0.017
Kids	-0.106	-3.01	-0.042	-0.105	-2.98	-0.042
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur	-0.058	-1.13	-0.023	-0.077	-1.54	-0.031
Farmer	-0.086	-0.61	-0.034	-0.093	-0.65	-0.037
Finance professional	0.288	5.37	0.112	0.291	5.46	0.115
Unemployed	-0.240	-0.95	-0.095	-0.243	-0.97	-0.096
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability			0.524			0.494
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	82.3					
Pseudo R-squared	0.0991			0.0977		
N	15,413			15,413		

## Panel B: Net Worth in Top 10% of the Distribution

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>IQ stanine</i>				0.090	6.78	0.025
Lowest	-0.741	-3.94	-0.232			
2	-0.606	-4.31	-0.182			
3	-0.445	-3.81	-0.126			
4	-0.488	-4.70	-0.140			
5	-0.238	-2.54	-0.062			
6	-0.143	-1.56	-0.036			
7	-0.158	-1.71	-0.039			
8	-0.007	-0.06	-0.002			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	-0.002	-0.35	0.000	-0.002	-0.41	-0.001
Vocational	-0.023	-5.29	-0.005	-0.023	-5.27	-0.006
Matricular	0.002	0.29	0.001	0.002	0.30	0.001
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	0.004	0.03	0.001	0.004	0.03	0.001
Lowest	0.156	1.24	0.033	0.150	1.19	0.040
2	-0.186	-1.52	-0.047	-0.185	-1.51	-0.055
3	-0.124	-1.16	-0.030	-0.122	-1.14	-0.036
4	-0.176	-1.65	-0.044	-0.172	-1.61	-0.051
5	-0.198	-1.94	-0.050	-0.205	-2.02	-0.062
6	-0.212	-2.01	-0.054	-0.211	-2.00	-0.063
7	-0.146	-1.39	-0.036	-0.150	-1.44	-0.044
8	-0.049	-0.53	-0.012	-0.045	-0.49	-0.013
9	-0.004	-0.06	-0.001	-0.002	-0.02	-0.001
Income Log-Growth Rate	-0.042	-1.05	-0.010	-0.040	-1.01	-0.011
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	-0.037	-0.40	-0.008	-0.039	-0.42	-0.011
Forest	0.102	0.90	0.023	0.098	0.87	0.027
Private equity	-0.056	-0.69	-0.013	-0.055	-0.68	-0.016
Foreign assets excluding equity	-0.377	-1.01	-0.104	-0.352	-0.93	-0.112
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	0.104	1.58	0.023	0.109	1.65	0.029
Married	0.044	0.52	0.010	0.048	0.56	0.013
Cohabitor	0.123	0.94	0.027	0.129	0.98	0.034
Kids	-0.238	-2.77	-0.056	-0.243	-2.81	-0.068
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur	-0.013	-0.11	-0.003	-0.010	-0.09	-0.003
Farmer	-0.352	-2.79	-0.093	-0.351	-2.78	-0.109
Finance professional	0.442	2.40	0.081	0.450	2.44	0.103
Unemployed	0.037	0.21	0.008	0.036	0.21	0.010
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability			0.852			0.801
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	51.0					
Pseudo R-squared	0.1123			0.1107		
N	3,857			3,857		

**Table 4****Fairlie-Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of the Secondary Effects of IQ on Stock Market Participation**

Table 4 reports on a Fairlie-Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. This analysis measures how much of the difference in high and low IQ individuals' stock market participation rates can be explained by differences in control variables such as education, income, and wealth. We first estimate a probit regression of a stock market participation dummy against all control variables, omitting the IQ regressor(s). We save the  $z$ -scores from this regression and translate them into predicted participation rates for different IQ groups. The decomposition technique computes the marginal effect of group mean differences for seven natural collections of the control variables. For a given stanine pairing, marginal effects are the sequence of changes in predicted participation rates obtained by sequentially changing each control variable's value from its group mean at the lower stanine to its mean at the higher stanine. Sequencing of the changes in the control variables are randomized, repeated, and averaged, and members are paired across the two stanines, to obtain marginal changes in participation rates and test statistics. Panel A reports on an analysis of participation rate differences between stanines 1 and 9. Panel B reports on stanines 2 and 8.

## Panel A: Decomposition Estimates for IQ 1 versus IQ 9 Individuals

	Decomposition	
	Estimate, %	z-value
Education	5.86	45.8
Income	4.92	45.4
Asset Class Ownership	0.77	18.9
Wealth	6.85	107.5
Demographics	0.18	4.5
Profession and Unemployment	1.66	27.2
Cohort	0.36	4.2
IQ=1 Participation Rate	7.98	
IQ=9 Participation Rate	40.68	
Explained Difference in Participation Rates	20.60	
Unexplained Difference in Participation Rates	12.10	

## Panel B: Decomposition Estimates for IQ 2 versus IQ 8 Individuals

	Decomposition	
	Estimate, %	z-value
Education	4.41	44.2
Income	4.32	45.1
Asset Class Ownership	0.53	18.8
Wealth	4.79	108.4
Demographics	0.16	4.9
Profession and Unemployment	1.17	27.2
Cohort	0.31	4.6
IQ=2 Participation Rate	10.55	
IQ=8 Participation Rate	36.62	
Explained Difference in Participation Rates	15.69	
Unexplained Difference in Participation Rates	10.38	

**Table 5****Stock Market Participation Decisions using a Control Function Approach to Estimation**

Table 5 reports on a probit regression of stock market participation on a person's own IQ score, a host of control variables (described in the body of the paper) derived from the Finnish tax data and the Finnish census data set, and a residual from a first-stage OLS regression of one's own IQ score against his brother's IQ score. The inclusion of the residual controls for an endogeneity problem that would arise if some unobservable controls were correlated with one's own IQ score. We identify 1,997 pairs of brothers using historical addresses and move-in and move-out dates for each subject in the Finnish tax data. Two males are identified as brothers if they lived together as children at the same address at the same time or moved at the same time. We also use transitivity to establish a sibling pair as described in the body of the paper. Participation is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held individual stocks registered with the FCSD. Pseudo *R*-squared and sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the table. *t*-values are estimated using the jackknife estimators. For the linear IQ specification, the columns report coefficients from the probit regression, associated *z*-values, and marginal effects on participation probability (evaluated at the average value of other regressors). The marginal effects for indicator variables indicate the shift in the participation probability when the indicator variable changes from zero to one. The dummy variable associated with the highest category—IQ stanine 9, university-level education, highest ordinary income, and taxable net worth in the highest decile—are omitted and serve as a benchmark. Taxable net worth deciles are computed after removing individuals with no taxable net worth. A dummy variable, no net worth, identifies the latter individuals. The regressions also contain 30 (unreported) cohort fixed effects for birth years 1953 through 1982.

Independent variables	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>IQ stanine</i>	0.279	7.87	0.069
<i>Education</i>			
Basic	-0.017	-2.24	-0.004
Vocational	-0.039	-5.58	-0.010
Matricular	-0.011	-1.51	-0.003
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>			
No Income	0.148	1.06	0.039
Lowest	0.394	2.05	0.116
2	0.156	0.93	0.041
3	0.170	1.18	0.045
4	0.004	0.03	0.001
5	-0.019	-0.16	-0.005
6	-0.026	-0.24	-0.006
7	-0.037	-0.38	-0.009
8	-0.004	-0.05	-0.001
9	-0.076	-0.89	-0.018
Income Log-Growth Rate	-0.018	-0.55	-0.004
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>			
Housing	0.088	0.90	0.023
Forest	-1.641	-2.62	-0.163
Private equity	-0.475	-2.29	-0.092
Foreign assets excluding equity			
<i>Net Worth decile</i>			
No Net Worth	-1.749	-10.95	-0.582
Lowest	-0.912	-3.34	-0.137
2	-0.570	-1.89	-0.105
3	-0.801	-3.30	-0.129
4	-1.127	-4.48	-0.150
5	-0.659	-2.74	-0.115
6	-0.743	-3.25	-0.124
7	-0.569	-2.72	-0.105
8	-0.492	-2.18	-0.095
9	-0.491	-2.47	-0.095
<i>Other demographics</i>			
Swedish speaker	0.200	2.11	0.054
Married	-0.264	-1.19	-0.058
Cohabitor	0.048	0.09	0.012
Kids	-0.300	-0.64	-0.064
<i>Occupation</i>			
Entrepreneur	-0.157	-0.59	-0.036
Farmer	1.258	2.35	0.446
Finance professional	0.393	0.82	0.116
Unemployed	-0.595	-4.11	-0.113
1 <sup>st</sup> Stage Control Variable	-0.213	-5.59	0.229
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes		
Baseline probability			0.166
Pseudo R-squared	0.4074		
N	3,994		

**Table 6****Stock Market Participation Decisions of Women using Brothers' IQ Scores as Proxies**

Table 6 reports summary data from probit regressions of women's stock market participation on their brother's IQ stanine dummies (or IQ score), used as a proxy for person's own IQ, and a host of control variables (described in the body of the paper) derived from the Finnish tax data and the Finnish census data set. We identify 4,124 brother-sister pairs using historical addresses and move-in and move-out dates for each subject in the Finnish tax data. Two opposite-gendered individuals are identified as a brother-sister pair if they lived together as children at the same address at the same time or moved at the same time. We also use transitivity to establish a sibling pair as described in the body of the paper. Participation is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held individual stocks registered with the FCSD. Pseudo *R*-squared and sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered by zip code. For each of two specifications, the columns report coefficients from the probit regression, associated *z*-values, and marginal effects on participation probability (evaluated at the average value of other regressors, except for IQ stanine dummies, which are evaluated at zero). The marginal effects for indicator variables indicate the shift in the participation probability when the indicator variable changes from zero to one. The dummy variable associated with the highest category—IQ stanine 9, university-level education, highest ordinary income, and taxable net worth in the highest decile—are omitted and serve as a benchmark. Taxable net worth deciles are computed after removing individuals with no taxable net worth. A dummy variable, no net worth, identifies the latter individuals. The regressions also contain 30 (unreported) cohort fixed effects for birth years 1953 through 1982.

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z -values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z -values	Marginal Effects
<i>Brother's IQ stanine</i>				0.066	3.30	0.015
Lowest	-0.744	-2.11	-0.141			
2	-0.353	-1.72	-0.083			
3	-0.400	-2.14	-0.091			
4	-0.297	-2.01	-0.071			
5	-0.247	-1.50	-0.061			
6	-0.126	-0.83	-0.033			
7	0.041	0.25	0.012			
8	-0.210	-1.24	-0.053			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	-0.003	-0.25	-0.001	-0.002	-0.20	-0.001
Vocational	-0.028	-2.33	-0.008	-0.027	-2.28	-0.006
Matricular	-0.004	-0.33	-0.001	-0.003	-0.27	-0.001
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	0.019	0.14	0.005	0.015	0.11	0.003
Lowest	0.012	0.06	0.003	-0.001	-0.01	0.000
2	0.154	0.91	0.045	0.149	0.89	0.037
3	0.063	0.49	0.018	0.052	0.40	0.012
4	0.027	0.20	0.007	0.031	0.23	0.007
5	0.088	0.77	0.025	0.089	0.77	0.021
6	-0.015	-0.15	-0.004	-0.013	-0.12	-0.003
7	0.181	2.04	0.053	0.180	2.02	0.044
8	-0.029	-0.35	-0.008	-0.029	-0.35	-0.007
9	0.094	1.10	0.027	0.091	1.07	0.021
Income Log-Growth Rate	0.008	0.16	0.002	0.008	0.17	0.002
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	0.182	1.26	0.054	0.199	1.37	0.049
Forest						
Private equity	-0.049	-0.11	-0.013	-0.072	-0.16	-0.016
Foreign assets excluding equity						
<i>Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.423	-7.24	-0.496	-1.401	-7.23	-0.451
Lowest	-0.977	-3.43	-0.165	-0.962	-3.41	-0.125
2	-1.057	-3.45	-0.170	-1.040	-3.41	-0.129
3	-0.656	-2.34	-0.132	-0.638	-2.27	-0.101
4	-0.457	-1.71	-0.102	-0.439	-1.65	-0.078
5	-0.836	-2.72	-0.152	-0.827	-2.70	-0.117
6	-0.278	-1.09	-0.068	-0.263	-1.05	-0.052
7	-0.212	-0.72	-0.053	-0.201	-0.69	-0.041
8	-0.261	-1.03	-0.064	-0.250	-0.99	-0.050
9	-0.162	-0.69	-0.042	-0.164	-0.70	-0.034
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	-0.105	-0.85	-0.028	-0.100	-0.82	-0.022
Married	-0.158	-0.72	-0.041	-0.142	-0.64	-0.030
Cohabitor	-0.027	-0.06	-0.007	-0.050	-0.10	-0.011
Kids	-0.120	-0.57	-0.032	-0.131	-0.63	-0.028
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur						
Farmer						
Finance professional	1.399	1.64	0.510	1.392	1.62	0.485
Unemployed	-0.151	-1.06	-0.039	-0.152	-1.06	-0.032
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability			0.196			0.145
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	14.6					
Pseudo R-squared	0.1725			0.1697		
N	4,124			4,124		

**Table 7****Stock Market Participation Decisions of Brothers using IQ Score Proxies**

Table 7 reports summary data from probit regressions of stock market participation on IQ score proxies and a host of control variables (described in the body of the paper) derived from the Finnish tax data and the Finnish census data set. Panel A reports on regressions in which IQ stanine dummies (or IQ score) are the IQ stanine dummies (or IQ score) of one's brother. Panel B reports on regressions which use the person's own IQ stanine dummies (or IQ score) as the IQ regressor(s). We identify 1,997 pairs of brothers using historical addresses and move-in and move-out dates for each subject in the Finnish tax data. Two males are identified as brothers if they lived together as children at the same address at the same time or moved at the same time. We also use transitivity to establish a sibling pair as described in the body of the paper. Participation is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held individual stocks registered with the FCSD. Pseudo *R*-squared and sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered by zip code. For each of two specifications, the columns report coefficients from the probit regression, associated *z*-values, and marginal effects on participation probability (evaluated at the average value of other regressors, except for IQ stanine dummies, which are evaluated at zero). The marginal effects for indicator variables indicate the shift in the participation probability when the indicator variable changes from zero to one. The dummy variable associated with the highest category—IQ stanine 9, university-level education, highest ordinary income, and taxable net worth in the highest decile—are omitted and serve as a benchmark. Taxable net worth deciles are computed after removing individuals with no taxable net worth. A dummy variable, no net worth, identifies the latter individuals. The regressions also contain 30 (unreported) cohort fixed effects for birth years 1953 through 1982.

Panel A: Stock Market Participation as a Function of Brother's IQ

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>Brother's IQ stanine</i>				0.105	5.32	0.026
Lowest	-0.585	-2.17	-0.132			
2	-0.692	-3.11	-0.148			
3	-0.330	-1.68	-0.085			
4	-0.461	-2.76	-0.111			
5	-0.230	-1.54	-0.062			
6	0.031	0.19	0.009			
7	0.229	1.32	0.074			
8	-0.139	-0.78	-0.039			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	-0.016	-1.65	-0.005	-0.015	-1.56	-0.004
Vocational	-0.037	-4.15	-0.011	-0.037	-4.17	-0.009
Matricular	-0.009	-0.89	-0.003	-0.008	-0.83	-0.002
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	0.201	1.45	0.064	0.183	1.33	0.050
Lowest	0.415	2.19	0.140	0.418	2.19	0.125
2	0.208	1.32	0.066	0.188	1.18	0.052
3	0.203	1.52	0.064	0.180	1.36	0.049
4	0.025	0.20	0.008	0.023	0.18	0.006
5	0.026	0.21	0.008	0.012	0.10	0.003
6	0.005	0.05	0.002	-0.007	-0.06	-0.002
7	-0.007	-0.07	-0.002	-0.016	-0.16	-0.004
8	0.036	0.38	0.011	0.028	0.30	0.007
9	-0.034	-0.46	-0.010	-0.056	-0.74	-0.014
Income Log-Growth Rate	-0.018	-0.42	-0.005	-0.017	-0.42	-0.004
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	0.065	0.50	0.020	0.057	0.45	0.015
Forest						
Private equity	-0.466	-2.03	-0.113	-0.506	-2.20	-0.099
Foreign assets excluding equity						
<i>Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.777	-10.20	-0.617	-1.767	-10.19	-0.591
Lowest	-0.960	-3.10	-0.180	-0.935	-3.11	-0.142
2	-0.512	-1.91	-0.121	-0.513	-1.91	-0.099
3	-0.818	-2.78	-0.166	-0.813	-2.87	-0.133
4	-1.128	-4.39	-0.194	-1.134	-4.43	-0.154
5	-0.721	-2.87	-0.154	-0.689	-2.74	-0.121
6	-0.731	-2.98	-0.155	-0.724	-2.93	-0.125
7	-0.600	-2.75	-0.137	-0.604	-2.79	-0.112
8	-0.456	-1.73	-0.111	-0.493	-1.89	-0.097
9	-0.543	-2.29	-0.127	-0.565	-2.41	-0.108
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	0.170	1.35	0.053	0.184	1.47	0.050
Married	-0.236	-0.80	-0.063	-0.203	-0.70	-0.047
Cohabitor	-0.375	-0.69	-0.095	-0.318	-0.58	-0.069
Kids	0.056	0.11	0.017	0.044	0.09	0.011
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur						
Farmer						
Finance professional	0.551	0.96	0.192	0.486	0.81	0.150
Unemployed	-0.679	-3.38	-0.155	-0.647	-3.35	-0.122
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability			0.220			0.170
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	54.2					
Pseudo R-squared	0.2564			0.2477		
N	3,994			3,994		

Panel B: Stock Market Participation as a Function of Own IQ in the Sample of Pairs of Brothers

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>Brother's IQ stanine</i>				0.097	5.21	0.025
Lowest	-0.569	-1.91	-0.117			
2	-0.604	-2.69	-0.121			
3	-0.143	-0.74	-0.037			
4	-0.411	-2.46	-0.092			
5	-0.064	-0.40	-0.017			
6	0.129	0.86	0.037			
7	0.176	1.11	0.052			
8	0.173	1.08	0.051			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	-0.018	-1.89	-0.005	-0.016	-1.69	-0.004
Vocational	-0.040	-4.68	-0.011	-0.039	-4.55	-0.010
Matricular	-0.011	-1.18	-0.003	-0.010	-1.07	-0.003
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	0.195	1.43	0.057	0.193	1.40	0.053
Lowest	0.416	2.08	0.132	0.410	2.10	0.123
2	0.195	1.16	0.057	0.146	0.89	0.039
3	0.216	1.62	0.064	0.219	1.61	0.061
4	0.041	0.33	0.011	0.047	0.38	0.012
5	0.008	0.06	0.002	0.005	0.04	0.001
6	-0.031	-0.29	-0.008	-0.006	-0.06	-0.002
7	-0.026	-0.27	-0.007	-0.011	-0.11	-0.003
8	0.027	0.27	0.007	0.039	0.41	0.010
9	-0.042	-0.55	-0.011	-0.038	-0.50	-0.010
Income Log-Growth Rate	-0.026	-0.61	-0.007	-0.024	-0.58	-0.006
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	0.045	0.35	0.012	0.059	0.47	0.015
Forest						
Private equity	-0.435	-1.83	-0.097	-0.450	-1.93	-0.091
Foreign assets excluding equity						
<i>Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.763	-9.92	-0.602	-1.736	-10.04	-0.582
Lowest	-1.001	-3.42	-0.163	-0.964	-3.33	-0.145
2	-0.473	-1.77	-0.103	-0.459	-1.75	-0.092
3	-0.834	-2.87	-0.149	-0.783	-2.76	-0.131
4	-1.067	-4.21	-0.168	-1.071	-4.25	-0.152
5	-0.671	-2.61	-0.131	-0.644	-2.58	-0.117
6	-0.722	-2.91	-0.138	-0.695	-2.81	-0.123
7	-0.586	-2.59	-0.121	-0.561	-2.57	-0.107
8	-0.504	-1.93	-0.108	-0.469	-1.83	-0.094
9	-0.509	-2.09	-0.109	-0.505	-2.11	-0.100
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	0.186	1.47	0.054	0.187	1.47	0.051
Married	-0.183	-0.63	-0.046	-0.214	-0.73	-0.049
Cohabitor	-0.101	-0.18	-0.026	-0.294	-0.53	-0.065
Kids	-0.115	-0.23	-0.030	-0.014	-0.03	-0.004
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur						
Farmer						
Finance professional	0.430	0.70	0.137	0.384	0.59	0.114
Unemployed	-0.565	-2.88	-0.122	-0.563	-2.83	-0.111
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability			0.191			0.171
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	39.5					
Pseudo R-squared	0.2528			0.2452		
N	3,994			3,994		

**Table 8****Matched Pairs Analysis of Brothers' Stock Market Participation Decisions**

Table 8 reports summary data from probit regressions of stock market participation on IQ scores and a host of control variables (described in the body of the paper) derived from the Finnish tax data and the Finnish census data set. Participation in Panel A is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held individual stocks registered with the FCSD. Participation in Panel B is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for subjects who purchase stock between 1995 and 2002. The regressions are estimated using data on 1,997 brother pairs for whom we have both IQ scores and all control variables. Two males are identified as brothers if they lived together as children at the same address at the same time or moved at the same time. We also use transitivity to establish a sibling pair as described in the body of the paper. The data are differenced across each brother pair to eliminate any unobserved family background variables. The data are organized so that the differenced dependent variable is either zero (neither participate or both participate) or one (one participates, the other does not). Pseudo *R*-squared and sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered by zip code. For each of two specifications, the columns report coefficients from the probit regression, associated *z*-values, and marginal effects on participation probability (evaluated at the average value of other regressors, except for IQ stanine dummies, which are evaluated at zero). The marginal effects for indicator variables indicate the shift in the participation probability when the indicator variable changes from zero to one. The dummy variable associated with the highest category—IQ stanine 9, university-level education, highest ordinary income, and taxable net worth in the highest decile—are omitted and serve as a benchmark. Taxable net worth deciles are computed after removing individuals with no taxable net worth. A dummy variable, no net worth, identifies the latter individuals. The regressions also contain 30 (unreported) cohort fixed effects for birth years 1953 through 1982.

Panel A: Dependent Variable = End-of-2000 Direct Stockholdings

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>Differences in IQ stanine</i>				0.001	0.06	0.000
Lowest	-0.116	-0.52	-0.019			
2	-0.047	-0.25	-0.008			
3	-0.005	-0.03	-0.001			
4	-0.048	-0.31	-0.008			
5	-0.112	-0.78	-0.018			
6	0.003	0.02	0.001			
7	-0.254	-1.75	-0.042			
8	0.082	0.52	0.013			
<i>Differences in Education</i>						
Basic	-0.007	-0.63	-0.001	-0.007	-0.65	-0.001
Vocational	-0.008	-0.67	-0.001	-0.008	-0.65	-0.001
Matricular	0.002	0.18	0.000	0.002	0.19	0.000
<i>Differences in Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	0.021	0.09	0.004	0.007	0.03	0.001
Lowest	0.415	1.71	0.068	0.421	1.75	0.070
2	-0.263	-1.31	-0.043	-0.264	-1.33	-0.044
3	0.051	0.29	0.008	0.033	0.19	0.006
4	-0.135	-0.84	-0.022	-0.130	-0.81	-0.022
5	-0.047	-0.33	-0.008	-0.050	-0.36	-0.008
6	0.089	0.69	0.015	0.104	0.81	0.017
7	-0.107	-0.91	-0.018	-0.113	-0.97	-0.019
8	-0.131	-1.24	-0.022	-0.123	-1.17	-0.021
9	-0.094	-1.00	-0.015	-0.096	-1.03	-0.016
Differences in Income Log-Growth Rate	0.042	0.83	0.007	0.036	0.72	0.006
<i>Differences in Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	-0.251	-1.89	-0.041	-0.259	-1.96	-0.043
Forest	-0.539	-0.89	-0.089	-0.561	-0.92	-0.094
Private equity	0.036	0.07	0.006	0.019	0.04	0.003
Foreign assets excluding equity						
<i>Differences in Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.361	-5.90	-0.224	-1.356	-5.92	-0.226
Lowest	-1.012	-2.89	-0.166	-1.021	-2.93	-0.170
2	-0.555	-1.62	-0.091	-0.588	-1.73	-0.098
3	-0.358	-1.01	-0.059	-0.363	-1.03	-0.061
4	-0.227	-0.68	-0.037	-0.214	-0.65	-0.036
5	-0.656	-2.17	-0.108	-0.660	-2.20	-0.110
6	-0.584	-1.94	-0.096	-0.558	-1.86	-0.093
7	-0.822	-3.01	-0.135	-0.814	-3.01	-0.136
8	-0.254	-0.80	-0.042	-0.201	-0.64	-0.034
9	-0.141	-0.51	-0.023	-0.141	-0.51	-0.024
<i>Differences in Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker						
Married	0.316	1.14	0.052	0.326	1.18	0.054
Cohabitor	0.567	1.12	0.093	0.573	1.14	0.096
Kids	-0.454	-1.09	-0.075	-0.470	-1.12	-0.078
<i>Differences in Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur	-0.307	-0.98	-0.050	-0.302	-0.98	-0.050
Farmer	-0.559	-0.84	-0.092	-0.511	-0.79	-0.085
Finance professional	-0.192	-0.30	-0.032	-0.205	-0.32	-0.034
Unemployed	-0.121	-1.01	-0.020	-0.097	-0.81	-0.016
Cohort Fixed Effects Differences	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability	0.091			0.093		
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	9.9					
Pseudo R-squared	0.1094			0.1024		
N	1,997			1,997		

Panel B: Dependent Variable = Purchases Made by Adults Between 1995 and 2002

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>Differences in IQ stanine</i>				0.048	2.68	0.009
Lowest	-0.516	-2.67	-0.095			
2	-0.383	-2.30	-0.070			
3	-0.326	-2.03	-0.060			
4	-0.388	-2.76	-0.071			
5	-0.323	-2.40	-0.059			
6	-0.246	-1.83	-0.045			
7	-0.323	-2.38	-0.059			
8	-0.086	-0.62	-0.016			
<i>Differences in Education</i>						
Basic	0.001	0.12	0.000	0.001	0.13	0.000
Vocational	-0.004	-0.36	-0.001	-0.003	-0.32	-0.001
Matricular	0.006	0.63	0.001	0.007	0.70	0.001
<i>Differences in Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	-0.391	-1.98	-0.072	-0.418	-2.16	-0.077
Lowest	-0.391	-1.73	-0.072	-0.395	-1.77	-0.073
2	-0.361	-1.71	-0.066	-0.368	-1.76	-0.068
3	-0.112	-0.66	-0.021	-0.124	-0.75	-0.023
4	0.056	0.34	0.010	0.057	0.35	0.011
5	-0.133	-0.98	-0.024	-0.130	-0.95	-0.024
6	0.038	0.33	0.007	0.049	0.41	0.009
7	-0.088	-0.77	-0.016	-0.089	-0.78	-0.016
8	-0.300	-3.00	-0.055	-0.288	-2.87	-0.053
9	-0.102	-1.10	-0.019	-0.105	-1.14	-0.019
Differences in Income Log-Growth Rate	0.004	0.08	0.001	-0.001	-0.03	0.000
<i>Differences in Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	0.039	0.27	0.007	0.043	0.30	0.008
Forest	-0.735	-1.81	-0.135	-0.787	-2.02	-0.145
Private equity	0.030	0.06	0.005	0.011	0.02	0.002
Foreign assets excluding equity						
<i>Differences in Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.070	-3.61	-0.197	-1.080	-3.66	-0.199
Lowest	-1.210	-2.87	-0.222	-1.209	-2.85	-0.223
2	-0.535	-1.18	-0.098	-0.573	-1.28	-0.106
3	-0.249	-0.56	-0.046	-0.258	-0.57	-0.048
4	-0.147	-0.37	-0.027	-0.139	-0.36	-0.026
5	-0.428	-1.00	-0.079	-0.435	-1.02	-0.080
6	-0.795	-2.12	-0.146	-0.789	-2.11	-0.146
7	-0.477	-1.39	-0.088	-0.480	-1.42	-0.089
8	-0.650	-1.97	-0.119	-0.620	-1.89	-0.114
9	-0.127	-0.39	-0.023	-0.125	-0.39	-0.023
<i>Differences in Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker						
Married	-0.259	-1.09	-0.048	-0.242	-1.01	-0.045
Cohabitor	-0.307	-0.77	-0.056	-0.308	-0.79	-0.057
Kids	0.088	0.26	0.016	0.082	0.24	0.015
<i>Differences in Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur	-0.126	-0.46	-0.023	-0.123	-0.45	-0.023
Farmer	-0.736	-1.51	-0.135	-0.695	-1.43	-0.128
Finance professional	0.438	0.70	0.080	0.426	0.68	0.079
Unemployed	-0.026	-0.27	-0.005	-0.009	-0.09	-0.002
Cohort Fixed Effects Differences	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability	0.106			0.107		
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	12.9					
Pseudo R-squared	0.0972			0.094		
N	1,997			1,997		

**Table 9****IQ Scores and Diversification**

Table 9 reports summary data from probit regressions (Panel A) and negative binomial regressions (Panel B) of portfolio diversification on IQ scores and a host of control variables (described in the body of the paper) derived from the Finnish tax data and the Finnish census data set. The dependent variable in Panel A's probit regression is a dummy variable that takes on the value one for subjects who held mutual funds at the end of 2000. The dependent variable in Panel B's negative binomial regression is the number of individual stocks the subject held at the end of 2000 in the FCSD data. All regressions are estimated using data on individuals who held at least one individual stock registered with the FCSD at the end of 2000. Pseudo *R*-squared (in Panel A) and sample sizes are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered by zip code. For each of two specifications, the columns report coefficients from the regression, associated *z*-values, and marginal effects on mutual fund participation probability (Panel A) or number of stocks held (Panel B), evaluated at the average value of other regressors, except for IQ stanine dummies, which are evaluated at zero. The marginal effects for indicator variables indicate the shift in the mutual fund participation probability (Panel A) or number of stocks held (Panel B) when the indicator variable changes from zero to one. The dummy variable associated with the highest category—IQ stanine 9, university-level education, highest ordinary income, and taxable net worth in the highest decile—are omitted and serve as a benchmark. Taxable net worth deciles are computed after removing individuals with no taxable net worth. A dummy variable, no net worth, identifies the latter individuals. The regressions also contain 30 (unreported) cohort fixed effects for birth years 1953 through 1982.

Panel A: Probit Regression of the Decision to Own Mutual Funds

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	<i>z</i> -values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	<i>z</i> -values	Marginal Effects
<i>IQ stanine</i>				0.047	11.82	0.013
Lowest	-0.363	-4.35	-0.095			
2	-0.388	-6.80	-0.100			
3	-0.323	-6.36	-0.086			
4	-0.198	-6.24	-0.056			
5	-0.187	-7.11	-0.053			
6	-0.110	-4.26	-0.032			
7	-0.081	-2.81	-0.024			
8	-0.051	-1.77	-0.015			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	0.001	0.58	0.000	0.001	0.56	0.000
Vocational	-0.002	-1.60	-0.001	-0.002	-1.63	-0.001
Matricular	0.000	0.23	0.000	0.000	0.17	0.000
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	-0.229	-3.51	-0.064	-0.228	-3.50	-0.056
Lowest	-0.371	-9.04	-0.099	-0.371	-9.04	-0.087
2	-0.345	-8.09	-0.093	-0.345	-8.10	-0.082
3	-0.300	-7.09	-0.082	-0.300	-7.11	-0.073
4	-0.371	-8.82	-0.099	-0.373	-8.87	-0.087
5	-0.301	-7.95	-0.082	-0.302	-8.00	-0.073
6	-0.261	-7.58	-0.073	-0.263	-7.55	-0.065
7	-0.213	-6.33	-0.060	-0.214	-6.37	-0.054
8	-0.151	-4.95	-0.044	-0.151	-4.96	-0.039
9	-0.123	-4.69	-0.036	-0.122	-4.65	-0.032
Income Log-Growth Rate	0.016	0.98	0.005	0.016	1.00	0.004
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	-0.081	-4.13	-0.025	-0.081	-4.15	-0.022
Forest	-0.090	-1.05	-0.027	-0.091	-1.05	-0.024
Private equity	-0.020	-0.56	-0.006	-0.020	-0.57	-0.006
Foreign assets excluding equity	-0.062	-0.21	-0.018	-0.057	-0.19	-0.015
<i>Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-0.970	-31.96	-0.285	-0.968	-31.93	-0.257
Lowest	-0.046	-1.01	-0.014	-0.046	-0.99	-0.012
2	-0.365	-9.03	-0.097	-0.364	-9.01	-0.085
3	-0.216	-5.53	-0.061	-0.215	-5.49	-0.054
4	-0.295	-6.94	-0.080	-0.294	-6.92	-0.071
5	-0.358	-8.35	-0.095	-0.357	-8.31	-0.084
6	-0.364	-8.69	-0.097	-0.364	-8.69	-0.085
7	-0.449	-11.30	-0.115	-0.448	-11.32	-0.101
8	-0.313	-7.49	-0.085	-0.313	-7.47	-0.075
9	-0.222	-6.29	-0.063	-0.221	-6.26	-0.055
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	0.219	7.39	0.071	0.217	7.30	0.064
Married	0.020	0.75	0.006	0.020	0.74	0.005
Cohabitor	0.056	1.19	0.017	0.054	1.14	0.015
Kids	-0.189	-6.23	-0.056	-0.188	-6.20	-0.050
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur	-1.513	-14.88	-0.231	-1.513	-14.89	-0.195
Farmer	-0.549	-5.12	-0.132	-0.550	-5.11	-0.115
Finance professional	0.330	6.53	0.111	0.330	6.51	0.102
Unemployed	-0.115	-2.22	-0.034	-0.116	-2.24	-0.030
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline probability			0.230			0.192
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	144.4					
Pseudo R-squared	0.0926			0.0924		
N	37,901			37,901		

Panel B: Negative Binomial Regression of the Number of Stocks Held

Independent variables	IQ Dummy Specification			Linear IQ Specification		
	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects	Coefficients	z-values	Marginal Effects
<i>IQ stanine</i>				0.038	13.47	0.094
Lowest	-0.274	-5.44	-0.657			
2	-0.284	-7.99	-0.678			
3	-0.280	-9.88	-0.669			
4	-0.159	-8.38	-0.403			
5	-0.118	-6.66	-0.306			
6	-0.052	-2.99	-0.138			
7	-0.059	-2.73	-0.155			
8	-0.016	-0.86	-0.042			
<i>Education</i>						
Basic	-0.003	-2.69	-0.011	-0.004	-3.30	-0.010
Vocational	-0.007	-6.54	-0.018	-0.007	-6.22	-0.017
Matricular	-0.002	-1.07	-0.005	-0.002	-1.14	-0.005
<i>Ordinary income decile</i>						
No Income	-0.022	-0.50	-0.057	-0.020	-0.46	-0.049
Lowest	-0.130	-5.60	-0.338	-0.130	-5.58	-0.308
2	-0.180	-8.14	-0.459	-0.181	-8.17	-0.420
3	-0.203	-8.86	-0.511	-0.204	-8.91	-0.470
4	-0.244	-11.75	-0.604	-0.248	-11.93	-0.559
5	-0.247	-10.67	-0.610	-0.250	-10.77	-0.565
6	-0.256	-11.06	-0.631	-0.259	-11.17	-0.584
7	-0.194	-8.61	-0.491	-0.195	-8.70	-0.452
8	-0.132	-6.95	-0.345	-0.132	-6.93	-0.316
9	-0.107	-6.62	-0.283	-0.106	-6.53	-0.257
Income Log-Growth Rate	0.013	1.18	0.035	0.014	1.26	0.034
<i>Wealth dummies by wealth type</i>						
Housing	-0.036	-2.94	-0.102	-0.038	-3.04	-0.095
Forest	-0.024	-0.51	-0.064	-0.024	-0.50	-0.059
Private equity	0.060	1.95	0.170	0.060	1.95	0.155
Foreign assets excluding equity	0.089	0.60	0.265	0.101	0.67	0.266
<i>Net Worth decile</i>						
No Net Worth	-1.025	-47.22	-2.861	-1.024	-46.78	-2.618
Lowest	-1.071	-32.77	-1.875	-1.070	-32.56	-1.717
2	-1.013	-36.57	-1.828	-1.012	-36.33	-1.674
3	-0.834	-34.30	-1.609	-0.833	-33.94	-1.473
4	-0.722	-24.28	-1.455	-0.722	-24.08	-1.333
5	-0.703	-25.04	-1.427	-0.702	-24.73	-1.307
6	-0.627	-24.97	-1.315	-0.628	-24.82	-1.205
7	-0.635	-21.92	-1.329	-0.634	-21.71	-1.217
8	-0.511	-18.78	-1.126	-0.510	-18.77	-1.032
9	-0.394	-15.63	-0.915	-0.394	-15.50	-0.838
<i>Other demographics</i>						
Swedish speaker	0.058	2.88	0.160	0.055	2.70	0.140
Married	-0.047	-2.56	-0.128	-0.047	-2.57	-0.117
Cohabitor	0.017	0.61	0.045	0.014	0.51	0.035
Kids	-0.083	-4.30	-0.228	-0.084	-4.36	-0.208
<i>Occupation</i>						
Entrepreneur	-0.045	-1.64	-0.120	-0.046	-1.70	-0.114
Farmer	-0.063	-0.96	-0.169	-0.065	-1.00	-0.159
Finance professional	0.213	6.55	0.650	0.216	6.63	0.602
Unemployed	0.020	0.65	0.057	0.019	0.62	0.049
Cohort Fixed Effects	Yes			Yes		
Baseline Number of Stocks			2.737			2.508
Wald- $\chi^2$ (IQ1 = ... = IQ8 = 0)	217.8					
N	37,901			37,901		