

# DALIDA KADYRZHANOVA

## **Address and Contacts:**

Robert H. Smith School of Business  
4422 Van Munching Hall  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD 20742-1815  
Telephone: (301) 405-3750  
E-mail: dkadyrz@rhsmith.umd.edu

## **Academic Employment:**

2006–present      Assistant Professor in Finance, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, MD

## **Education:**

1999–2006      Ph.D., M.A., Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY  
2001              M.A., Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY  
1996–1999      B.A., Economics, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA

## **Teaching and Research Fields:**

Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Industrial Organization

## **Teaching Experience:**

Spring 2007      Advanced Financial Management, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, MD (Undergraduate)  
2004–2005      Teaching Assistant, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, Economic Analysis for International Affairs (Graduate)  
2000–2003      Teaching Assistant, Columbia University, Principles of Economics (Undergraduate)

## **Honors:**

2007              Summer Research Award, General Research Board, University of Maryland  
2003              Dissertation Fellow, Columbia University  
2003              Wueller Research Prize, Columbia University  
2002–2004      Japan-IMF scholarship, IMF  
2001–Present    Teaching Fellow, Columbia University  
2001              Laura Estabrook Romine Fellow in Economics, Bryn Mawr College

## **Work Experience:**

2002              AIG, Wilmington, DE, Product Analyst

**Working papers:**

**“Concentrating on Governance”** (with Matthew Rhodes-Kropf)

Does corporate governance matter for shareholder value? We examine this notoriously difficult question by modeling and testing a product market channel through which antitakeover provisions affect value. The central insight of our model is that the valuation effect of antitakeover provisions varies with the degree of industry concentration. This insight delivers several unique cross-sectional predictions: (1) firms in concentrated industries should be more likely to adopt antitakeover provisions; (2) antitakeover provisions should lead to higher takeover premiums, but only in concentrated industries; (3) antitakeover provisions should be associated with higher shareholder value, but only in concentrated industries. We test these predictions using a large sample of manufacturing firms over the 1990 to 2005 period and find robust support for our theory. Our results suggest that governance reforms directed toward weakening takeover defenses may come with benefits, but also with costs.

**“The Leader-Bias Hypothesis: Corporate Control Dynamics in Industry Equilibrium”**

This paper argues that corporate control imperfections have significant consequences for industry structure. In a dynamic oligopoly model with empire-building (Jensen, 1986) managers and endogenously chosen corporate control, one important benefit of managerial discretion is that aggressive product market strategies deter the expansion of rivals. While tight control by shareholders brings about efficiency gains, it also hampers managers’ ability to capture larger market shares. This trade-off implies that the choice of lax control is favored by shareholders of leading firms whose profits are more vulnerable to the expansion of undeterred rivals. The resulting dynamic industry equilibrium suggests a theory of predation based on imperfections in corporate control.

**“Optimal CEO Incentives and Industry Dynamics”** (with Antonio Falato)

This paper develops a competitive equilibrium model of CEO compensation and industry dynamics. CEOs make product pricing and product improvement decisions subject to shareholders’ compensation choices and idiosyncratic shocks to product quality. The choice of high-powered incentives optimally trades-off the benefits from expected product improvements and the associated agency costs. In market equilibrium, the interaction between CEO pay and product market decisions affects the stationary distribution of firms. We characterize a dynamic feedback effect of industry structure on CEO incentives. As a result of this effect, we predict an inverse relation between the magnitude of the performance-based component of CEO pay and, (i) across industries, the degree of heterogeneity of industry structure; (ii) within industries, firm position with respect to its peers. We empirically estimate pay-performance sensitivity for a large sample of U.S. CEOs and other top executives over the 1993 to 2004 period and find strong support for our theory. Our results offer a novel product market rationale for the increased reliance of CEO pay on bonuses and stock options over the 1990s.

**“Peer Effects in Corporate Governance”** (with Kose John)

Using data on antitakeover provisions and headquarter location for a large sample of U.S. public corporations, this paper documents robust evidence of peer effects in corporate governance. In particular, we have two sets of findings: 1) good governance breeds good governance - i.e., firms are less likely to adopt antitakeover provisions if fewer of their peers adopt them; 2) good governance matters the most when peers have good governance - i.e., the negative effect of antitakeover provisions on corporate performance and policies is concentrated in areas with low incidence of antitakeover provisions. These results are robust to employing a novel triple-difference estimator that addresses causality by exploiting exogenous variation in peer governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws. Thus, the literature assessing the governance-performance relationship should take peer effects into account.

**Work in Progress:**

“To the Barricades: Shareholder Activism, CEO Monitoring, and Corporate Investment”

“Preemptive Entrenchment: Theory and Evidence”

“Dissecting Governance and Performance”

**Conference Presentations:**

2008 American Finance Association Meetings, New Orleans  
2008 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, New Orleans  
2008 American Economic Association Meetings, New Orleans  
2007 Fourth Annual Washington University Conference on Corporate Finance, St Louis, MO  
2007 18th Annual Conference On Financial Economics And Accounting, NYU Stern, NY  
2007 European Finance Association Meeting, Ljubljana, Slovenia  
2007 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, Duke University, NC  
2007 American Finance Association Meetings, Chicago  
2006 Frank Batten Young Scholars Conference, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg  
2006 North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Boston  
2005 IUI/CEPR Conference on Innovation, Ownership and Competition, Stockholm  
2005 Society for Computational Economics Meeting, Washington, DC  
2003 Third Villa Mondragone Workshop, “Tor Vergata” University, Rome

**Seminar Presentations:**

2007 Stockholm School of Economics, NYU Stern  
2006 NYU Stern, University of Notre Dame, University of Michigan, University of North Carolina, University of Maryland, McGill University, LBS, LSE, INSEAD, University of Rochester, University of Toronto, Columbia University

**Discussant:**

2006 17th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting, Georgia State University, Atlanta, “Favoritism of Markets in Capital Allocation” by Mariassunta Giannetti and Xiaoyun Yu  
2006 European Finance Association, Zurich, “The Toehold Puzzle,” by Sandra Betton, Espen Eckbo, and Karin Thorburn

**Referee:**

2007 Review of Finance, Finance Research Letters, Economica